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RETHINKING REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
RonNell Andersen Jones*
Forty years ago, in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court made its first
and only inquiry into the constitutional protection of the relationship be-
tween a reporter and a confidential source. This case-decided at a
moment in American history in which the role of an investigative press,
and of information provided by confidential sources, was coming to the
forefront of public consciousness in a new and significant way-produced
a reporter-focused "privilege" that is now widely regarded to be both doc-
trinally questionable and deeply inconsistent in application. Although the
post-Branzburg privilege has been recognized as flawed in a variety of
ways, commentators and scholars have largely ignored its most fundamen-
tal shortcoming: by making the reporter the nucleus of the constitutional
inquiry, the Court has unnecessarily complicated an analysis that has a
much more natural doctrinal starting point. This Article argues that the
Court should abandon its reporter-based approach to confidential-source
cases and replace it with a constitutional inquiry that focuses on the anon-
ymous source. It suggests that analyzing confidential-source cases based
on the anonymous-speech rights of sources rather than on the information-
flow or newsgathering rights of the reporters will more fully acknowledge
the scope of First Amendment interests at stake and will eliminate the need
to define who is a "reporter" for purposes of the privilege-a task that has
become complicated to a degree of near impossibility as technological
changes alter the primary mechanisms for gathering and disseminating
news.
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INTRODUCTION
Four decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court made its first and only in-
quiry into what journalists see as the First Amendment issue most critical to
the flow of information in our democracy1 : the degree of protection that
should be afforded to newsgatherers who promise confidentiality to
sources.
2
The case was Branzburg v. Hayes,3 and it was decided at a moment in
American history in which the role of an investigative press-and of infor-
mation provided to the press by confidential sources-was coming to the
1. See James A. Guest & Alan L. Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen
Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 18, 18 (1969) ("[N]ewsmen have ... argued
that courts should interpret the first amendment as giving a constitutional privilege to conceal
sources in order to assure the free flow of news."); Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment
and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the
Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 261 (2004) ("[W]ithout protection of their sources,
won't information flows dry up and freedom of expression lose meaning?").
2. The Court has denied certiorari in several cases raising the issue in the last decade.
See, e.g., Wen Ho Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1187 (2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied sub nom. Cooper v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005), opinion superseded, 438 F.3d
1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
3. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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forefront of public consciousness in a new and significant way.4 First
Amendment and media-law scholars of the day foresaw the indispensable
function that journalists and their unidentified sources would play in reveal-
ing government corruption, uncovering corporate misbehavior, and
illuminating injustices.' But they also recognized the inherent complexity in
striking a balance between the benefit of the anonymous provision of social-
ly important information and the risk that confidentiality in newsgathering
might impede future legal investigations-for example, if reporters later
refused to share information perceived as critical to civil or criminal cases.
In response to these tensions, proposals developed for a so-called "report-
er's privilege" 6-a legal construct that, when successfully invoked, would
make the news reporter an exception to "the longstanding principle that 'the
public ... has a right to every man's evidence."' 7 Now embodied in state law
by statute, constitutional provision, court decision, or court rule in nearly all
fifty states,8 the privilege permits a reporter, under defined circumstances, to
4. Investigative journalism had recently hit the mainstream and was becoming accept-
ed as a legitimate form of news reporting. JAMES L. AUCOIN, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 18 (2005). Stories involving confidential sources gained a very
high profile; they included the publication of the Pentagon Papers and the Washington Post's
coverage of the Watergate scandal, which broke the same year that the Court handed down the
Branzburg decision and involved a confidential source. See N.Y Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides
Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1972, at Al.
5. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 606 [hereinafter Blasi, The Checking Value]; Robert Haydock, Jr., The
Public Interest in Protection of Newsmen's Sources, Bos. B.J., Feb. 1974, at 7, 8 ("IT]he right
to protect these sources is particularly important in connection with government misfeasance
or malfeasance."); James D. Henderson, Comment, The Protection of Confidences: A Quali-
fied Privilege for Newsmen, 1971 LAW & Soc. ORD. 385, 387-89 ("With numerous ...
examples on record, it becomes clear that when a newsman is subpoenaed to reveal confidenc-
es, his injury is shared by the public.").
6. See Cynthia H. Plevin & Steven M. Plevin, Comment, Journalists in the Courts: To-
ward Effective Shield Legislation, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 664, 664 (1974) ("[Ilf joumalists are to be
protected from compelled disclosure of confidential sources and undisseminated material ... that
protection must find its source either in action by Congress or by the state legislatures."); Alice
M. Klement, Note, Shaping the Contours of the Newsperson's Privilege-Gilbert v. Allied Chem-
ical Corp., 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 185, 185 n.1 (1976) (describing shield law proposals for
statutorily granting the privilege). See generally Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Em-
pirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971) [hereinafter Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege]
(offering empirical data suggesting a need for a reporter's privilege); David Gordon, The Con-
fidences Newsmen Must Keep, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1971, at 15 (arguing in
favor of a reporter's privilege).
7. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRI-
ALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
8. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of
Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 589-91, 652-53 (2008)
[hereinafter Jones, Empirical Study] (listing state statutes and cases); RonNell Andersen
Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact, Perception, and Legal Protection in the Changing World of
American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317, 384-86 (2009) [hereinafter Jones, Media Sub-
poenas] (same); Erik Ugland, The New Abridged Reporter's Privilege: Policies, Principles,
1223May 2013]
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refuse to respond to a subpoena that seeks information the reporter received
confidentially in the newsgathering process, and to avoid facing the con-
tempt citation that might otherwise result from such a refusal.9 These laws,
arising as they did from the heightened awareness of the admirable role of
the investigative press, are largely tailored to serving that role. They pre-
sume that reporters need this unique treatment in order to fulfill their
"public-serving function of producing important news stories."'0 Thus,
although both the reporter and the confidential source are essential to the
widespread distribution of that publicly useful information, the doctrinal
focus has almost exclusively been on the reporter.
Indeed, as the doctrine's very moniker makes clear, reporter's privilege
laws aim to ensure the anonymous provision of socially important infor-
mation by protecting the newsgatherer to whom that information is
provided. The state statutory or common-law right belongs to the reporter
herself-a privilege attached to a given occupational status, based on the
public good produced by those holding that status.I
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that when the Supreme Court in
Branzburg tackled the question of whether the privilege should be recog-
nized as a federal constitutional matter, it conducted its First Amendment
analysis through this same lens. In that seminal case, the petitioners asked
the Court to acknowledge a First Amendment-based reporter's privilege-
that is, to hold that the U.S. Constitution guarantees a reporter the right to
keep the confidence of a would-be anonymous news source when the re-
porter is later subpoenaed to testify regarding the confidential information. 12
and Pathological Perspectives, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 57-59 (2010) (summarizing state law
trends).
9. See Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and
Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 446-47 (2003).
10. Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 326 & n.28 (citing commentary making
this argument).
11. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003) ("A person engaged in newspa-
per, radio, television or reportorial work, or connected with or employed by a newspaper,
radio or television station, shall not be compelled to testify . ... " (emphasis added)); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(2) (2012) ("[N]o newsperson shall, without such newsperson's ex-
press consent, be compelled to disclose ...... (emphasis added)); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(2)
(2012) ("A professional journalist has a qualified privilege not to be a witness concerning, and
not to disclose the information, including the identity of any source... " (emphasis added));
NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2011) ("No reporter, former reporter or editorial employee of any
newspaper, periodical or press association or employee of any radio or television station may
be required to disclose .... " (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (2000) ("A
person engaged in gathering information for publication or broadcast connected with or em-
ployed by the news media or press, or who is independently engaged in gathering information
for publication or broadcast, shall not be required ... to disclose ... any information or the
source of any information .... (emphasis added)).
12. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
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While the split decision in Branzburg narrowly refused to recognize
such a privilege,13 a First Amendment-based reporter's privilege nonetheless
was launched by the case, as federal courts in the wake of Branzburg ex-
pressed a willingness to acknowledge the qualified privilege proposed by
the Branzburg dissent, at least in cases that were not on all fours with that
case's facts.' 4 In this way, a constitutional reporter's privilege doctrine
emerged that is now recognized in some form in nearly all federal jurisdic-
tions. Again, the courts' inquiries center on the journalists' rights to gather
news and report it, rather than on any rights of the would-be anonymous
sources.
15
What has emerged post-Branzburg is a doctrine that is uniformly re-
garded as confusing, resulting in a "privilege" that is ambiguous, 6
inconsistent, 7 and the subject of significant criticism.'8 And although the
post-Branzburg privilege has been recognized as flawed in a variety of
ways, 19 commentators and scholars have largely ignored what may be its
13. A narrow majority insisted "that reporters, like other citizens, [must] respond to
relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal
trial." Id. at 690-9 1.
14. See Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 346 & n. I11 (listing cases in which
"federal circuit courts gave a media-generous reading to Branzburg").
15. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 E3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he
rights a newspaper or reporter has to refuse disclosure in response to a subpoena extends to
the... reporter's telephone records .... " (emphasis added)); United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d
346, 357 (3d Cir. 1980) (referencing "[t]he journalists' privilege" and the "right for a news-
man to refuse to answer relevant and material questions asked during a criminal proceeding"
(emphasis added)); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972) (referencing "a
journalist's right to protect confidential sources" (emphasis added)).
16. Baker, 470 F.2d at 781 ("[F]ederal law on the question of compelled disclosure...
is at best ambiguous."); Laura Durity, Shielding Journalist- "Bloggers": The Need to Protect
Newsgathering Despite the Distribution Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11, T 14,
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l 157&context=dltr ("[T]he am-
biguous outcome [of Branzburg] has led to three decades of assorted judicial and legislative
approaches to the reporter's privilege and significant lower court confusion ... " (footnote
omitted)); Note, Public and Press Rights of Access to Prisoners After Branzburg and Mandel,
82 YALE L.J. 1337, 1347 (1973) (addressing "Branzburg's ambiguity").
17. McDonald, supra note 1, at 254 (noting that newsgathering law is inconsistent).
18. See, e.g., Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law,
Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 815, 836 (1984)
("Even a thorough reading of the four opinions in the Branzburg case will not lead to an abso-
lutely certain understanding of the holding in the one Supreme Court decision that dealt with
the notion of reporter's privilege." (footnote omitted)); Genevra Kay Loveland, Comment,
Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEx. L. REV.
1440, 1462 (1975) ("As a result, their opinions [in subsequent cases about the public's right to
know], like Branzburg, are contradictory and confusing. After generously bestowing first
amendment status upon newsgathering, they seem fearful of venturing too far.").
19. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value, supra note 5, at 602 ("One can only be dissat-
isfied with the current state of Supreme Court doctrine regarding newsgathering. In effect, the
Court has failed to accord the newsgathering interest the full measure of favorable procedures,
presumptions, and substantive doctrines that normally follow from the determination that a
particular interest is truly of First Amendment pedigree."); McDonald, supra note 1, at 253
("[J]udges complain[] about the 'unsettled' and 'fuliginous' nature of the legal principles in
1225May 2013]
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most fundamental doctrinal shortcoming. By making the reporter the nucleus
of the constitutional inquiry, the Court has unnecessarily complicated an anal-
ysis that has a much more natural doctrinal starting point, and in so doing has
produced a test that is both unprincipled and impractical.
This Article argues that the Court should abandon its reporter-based ap-
proach to confidential-source cases and replace it with a constitutional
inquiry that focuses on the source whose name or other identifying infor-
mation the reporter seeks to keep anonymous. Analyzing confidential-source
cases based on the anonymous-speech rights of sources, rather than on the
information-flow or newsgathering rights of the reporters, will have at least
three salutary effects. First, it will eliminate the need to define who is a "re-
porter" for purposes of the privilege. 0 Second, it will enable the Court to
abandon its complex and necessarily speculative investigations into how
great a contribution the press makes to public dialogue (and what degree of
privilege is necessary to ensure that continued contribution), and allow it to
draw instead upon deeply rooted and well-defined principles regarding the
protection of anonymous speech, which have been acknowledged since the
nation's founding.2' Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this approach
will acknowledge the true breadth of interests and First Amendment values
at stake in the confidential-source dynamic. It will allow the source to assert
her own First Amendment rights, but it will also permit reporters to take
advantage of third-party standing doctrine when-as is virtually always the
case-the reporter argues for anonymous-speech rights that in fact belong
to someone other than herself.22 In so doing, this approach will continue to
recognize the First Amendment's public-information values and the vital
role of newsgathering, but without slighting the theoretical importance of
the individual-liberty interest of the original speaker. Indeed, a wave of
recent cases involving media assertions of third-party standing in some-
what analogous circumstances highlights the workability of this approach.
In these cases, involving anonymous comments about completed stories
posted on online media sites, courts have already essentially embraced this
sensible analysis.23
Part I describes the historical trajectory and motives of the journalism
industry that combined to lead the Court down a reporter's privilege path
that considers the rights of the reporter rather than the rights of the speaker
whose name the reporter refuses to reveal. It then addresses the analytical
this area." (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 29 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), and El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F2d 488, 494 (1st Cir. 1992))); Richard
A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HkRv. L. REV.
31, 95 & n.191 (2005) ("[C]asting the essential fifth vote for the 'majority' opinion while also
writing a separate opinion qualifying the Court's opinion [as in Branzburg] is bad practice
20. See infra Section I.B.I.
21. See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See infra Section M.D.
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drawbacks and practical complexities that this reporter-focused approach
has produced.
Part II proposes a new doctrinal approach that considers the anonymous-
speech rights of the reporter's source. It investigates the theoretical
moorings for a robust protection of anonymous communicators and empha-
sizes the ways in which the Court, in developing this analytical rubric, has
embraced two separate sets of First Amendment values-only one of
which is recognized in the post-Branzburg framework.
Part III demonstrates the ways in which this anonymous-speaker ap-
proach, coupled with third-party standing for reporters, would produce
greater doctrinal consistency than the current approach and would better
strike the often-difficult balance between the virtues of the anonymous pro-
vision of socially important information and the risks of confidentiality
impeding future legal investigations. Using the analogous online-speech
cases as illustrations, it argues that adopting the anonymous-speaker ap-
proach in the larger realm of cases that currently employ the reporter's
privilege doctrine would add uniformity to the law and better serve the true
scope of First Amendment values that are at stake.
The Article's conclusion urges the Court to provide guidance that is
more useful to reporters and sources and more consistent with overarching
First Amendment norms by giving reporters third-party standing to assert
the First Amendment anonymous-speech rights of their sources.
I. THE MOTIVATIONS FOR AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE BRA NZBURG APPROACH
As described more fully below,24 by the time the question of protection
of confidential sources reached the Supreme Court in Branzburg, it was al-
ready clear as a doctrinal matter that speakers enjoy a robust First
Amendment right of anonymity;25 this analysis could have provided a logi-
cal and workable basis for the Court's First Amendment thinking on the
confidential-source question. Yet the Court's inquiry in Branzburg-and
the somewhat strained and deeply controversial privilege that developed
from it-largely ignored this acknowledged set of rights. In assessing the
validity and workability of shifting confidential-source doctrine to an anony-
mous-speaker approach, it is useful first to investigate both how the current
approach came to be and what practical and doctrinal consequences it has
produced. This Part describes the historical forces and litigation strategies that
brought about today's post-Branzburg doctrine and then outlines the com-
plexities that this doctrinal development has produced. It also explores the
ways in which those complexities threaten the flow of important information
to the public.
24. See infra Section II.A.
25. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
May 20131 1227
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A. A Doctrinal Focus on the Reporter
At least two powerful forces combined to drive the Court's Branzburg
doctrine in a reporter-centric direction that overlooks the rights of the
speaker whose name the reporter refuses to reveal. First, a unique social and
historical arc positioned legal scholars, attorneys, and the justices them-
selves at a vantage point that spotlighted the role of the press and the
uniqueness of the reporter's contribution to public dialogue on important
matters. Second, a set of news industry incentives tailored Supreme Court
litigation choices and post-Branzburg developments in distinctly journalist-
focused ways.
1. Historical Momentum
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the consolidated cases that would
become Branzburg v. Hayes developed in the lower courts, a series of "de-
velopments in the journalism profession"2 6 heightened the public's sense of
the media's importance and magnified the demand for both watchdog re-
porting and legal protections supporting those efforts.
In the wake of the watershed Pentagon Papers revelations27 and "[o]n the
eve of such major journalistic accomplishments as the Watergate cover-
age,"28 the press found itself with a new, critical function of uncovering
governmental malfeasance in the war in Vietnam and elsewhere.2 9 Increas-
ingly self-identifying as enforcers of accountability in government in
numerous ways, the media pressed for open-government laws,30 pushed
back against closed and sometimes recalcitrant administrations, 31 and took
26. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege, supra note 6, at 234.
27. Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, I HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 185, 197-98 (2007) (noting that it was a confidential informant, Daniel Ellsberg,
who had secretly given the New York Times the series of classified documents focused on the
history of the government's policy in Vietnam); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEx. L. REV. 429,
523 n.503 (2002) (discussing the prosecution of Ellsberg as the source of the leak).
28. Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 328. The Watergate break-in occurred just
days before the Court issued its Branzburg opinion. Joel M. Gora, The Source of the Problem
of Sources: The First Amendment Fails the Fourth Estate, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1399, 1400-01
(2008). The Washington Post's coverage of the Watergate scandal, made possible by an in-
formant then referred to as "Deep Throat," was published later that same year. Bernstein &
Woodward, supra note 4.
29. See Mark Feldstein, A Muckraking Model: Investigative Reporting Cycles in Ameri-
can History, 11 INT'L J. PRESS/POL. 105, 111-13 (2006) (describing the "resurgence of
investigative reporting").
30. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-
Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 580-91 (2011) [hereinafter Jones,
Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy]; Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for
the "Right to Know", 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (1962).
31. See, e.g., ROBERT DALLEK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON 260 (2004) (describing Johnson's
tensions with the media); DAVID GERGEN, EYEWITNESS TO POWER 88 (2000) ("The [Johnson]
[A]dministration lied so notoriously, reporters said, that it didn't have a credibility gap-it had
1228 [Vol. I111: 1221
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on a role as counterweights to government in a way never before seen. 32 A
surge in investigative reporting33 was accompanied by a surge in both the
reputation of the press and the reliance on unnamed sources.34 The probing
approach and confrontational attitude toward government-which had al-
ways existed to some degree among the American media 35-took on an
entirely new vitality and "became, at least temporarily, the most conspicu-
ous characteristics of a free press. '3 6 The result was a marked transition in
how reporters perceived their own role. While in the 1950s "[m]ost journal-
ists regarded themselves as no more than notetakers, ' '37 stenographically
delivering government information to readers, throughout the 1960s an ava-
lanche of aggressive journalism students produced a generation of young
reporters who saw themselves as watchdogs.38
At this zenith of American journalism, legal scholars proposed that
constitutional doctrines and statutory protections should expand to better
protect the valuable institution of the press. Arguing that high-ranking of-
ficials increasingly "made a display of their contempt for truth" and
flouted openness and accountability,3 9 scholars praised the media for their
role in uncovering corruption and urged development of legal doctrines
that would better enable such conduct. Perhaps most famously, Justice
Stewart argued that the Founders drafted the Press Clause of the First
Amendment with the recognition that a "free press meant organized, ex-
pert scrutiny of government."4 Other scholars likewise pressed the Court
a canyon."); WILLIAM E. PORTER, ASSAULT ON THE MEDIA 3 (1976) (describing Nixon's ef-
forts to "intimidate publishers and broadcast ownerships"); WILLIAM SAERE, BEFORE THE
FALL 341-42 (1975) (chronicling Nixon's view that "the press is the enemy").
32. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of
Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1077-78 (1973).
33. Investigative journalism rose to such prominence during this time period that the Pu-
litzer Prize began to include a separate category for investigative reporting. Anderson, supra
note 27, at 449 n. 102.
34. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege, supra note 6, at 252; see also Guest &
Stanzler, supra note 1, at 43, 57-61 (quoting major newspaper editors describing the growing
percentage of stories arising from confidential sources); Note, Reporters and Their Sources:
The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 330 (1970) (shar-
ing press surveys on the number of stories based on confidential sources).
35. See, e.g., THOMAS A. BIRKLAND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLICY PROCESS:
THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND MODELS OF PUBLIC POLICY MAKING 144 (2011) (describing early
"muckrakers"); Erik Ugland, Denarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 176 (2008) (describing
the "long tradition of investigative journalism in the United States").
36. Anderson, supra note 27, at 449; see also Paulette D. Kilmer, The Press and Gov-
ernment, in AMERICAN JOURNALISM 23, 30 (W. David Sloan & Lisa Mullikin Parcell eds.,
2002) ("Press skepticism toward the government that had originated years earlier came to a
head during the Vietnam War and reached full flower during the Watergate scandal.").
37. AUCOIN, supra note 4, at 47.
38. Id. at 48.
39. Anthony Lewis, Cantankerous, Obstinate, Ubiquitous: The Press, 1975 UTAH L.
REV. 75, 78.
40. Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
1229May 20131
Michigan Law Review
to better "safeguard" the press and encouraged legislatures to develop "long
overdue" laws to assist the "free news media designed to serve the public."'
The momentum to protect the press through the law was palpable.
Public views of the media followed suit. The "Fourth Estate"4 2 role of
the press in investigating and reporting governmental abuse was increasing-
ly understood and publicly celebrated.43 As journalism became more and
more committed to investigative work, public trust and confidence in the
media soared.4 And when the reporters engaging in this investigative work
found themselves increasingly subject to subpoenas requesting confidential-
source identities,45 the public was inclined to protect them.
46
Given this unique and powerful moment in the history of the American
press, it is little wonder that the complex and multifaceted questions of
whether and how to protect the anonymous provision of information to a
news reporter would be answered through a lens that focused on the media's
41. Gordon, supra note 6, at 20.
42. Stewart, supra note 40, at 634 ("The primary purpose of the constitutional guaran-
tee of a free press was ... to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an
additional check on the three official branches.").
43. Lewis, supra note 39, at 76 ("[R]eporters are culture heroes and our cleanest-cut
young people dream of being Woodward and Bernstein."); see also Virginia Dodge Fielder &
David H. Weaver, Public Opinion on Investigative Reporting, NEWSPAPER RES. J., Winter
1982, at 54, 57 (noting that 77.1 percent of the public describes investigative reporting as
"very important").
44. See DAVID A. YALOF & KENNETH DAUTRICH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
MEDIA IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 10 (2002) (describing 1970s data showing that
nearly three-quarters of Americans expressed confidence in news anchor Walter Cronkite and
noting a "positive connection" between the public and the press).
45. See Blasi, Newsman's Privilege, supra note 6, at 229-30.
46. See Haydock, supra note 5, at 8 ("[Slixty-two per cent of [respondents to a Gallup
Poll in the 1970s] agreed that news reporters should be protected from being forced to disclose
confidential sources."). These public sentiments were reflected in the numerous proposals at
the time for shield laws at both the state and federal levels. For discussion of the "rash of fed-
eral shield law proposals" in the 1970s, see Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 345.
Likewise, of the states that now have shield laws, nineteen of them enacted or amended their
laws between 1960 and 1980. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300-09.25.390 (2012) (enacted
1967); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003) (enacted 1960); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070
(West 2009) (enacted 1965, amended 1967, 1971, 1972, and 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 4320-4326 (1999 & Supp. 2010) (enacted 1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-
45:1459 (2010) (enacted 1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-595.025 (West 2010) (enacted
1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 (2011) (amended 1977 and 1979); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 20-144 to 20-147 (2007) (enacted 1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2011) (enacted 1971,
amended 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011) (enacted 1960, amended 1977);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (LexisNexis 1998) (enacted 1973); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney 2009) (enacted 1970, amended 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2010)
(enacted 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2008) (enacted
1977); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (2011) (enacted 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-44.540
(2011) (enacted 1973, amended 1979); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000) (enacted
1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2012) (enacted 1971); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208
(2000) (enacted 1973).
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role in a democracy and the value of confidential sources to investigative
reporting.
47
2. The Litigation of Branzburg
It was against this backdrop of increasing reliance on confidential
sources and heightened focus on the media as a check on government that
Branzburg48 reached the Supreme Court. Indeed, the fact that the Court con-
solidated Branzburg with two other cases demonstrates that, by 1972, the
issue of how best to protect the press in its investigative work involving
anonymous sources had come to a head. Along with Branzburg-which it-
self comprised two separate appeals-the Court also decided In re Pappas4 9
and United States v. Caldwell.5" The consolidated cases, litigated by media
companies and with the intense support of amicus press organizations,5
were understandably framed in journalist-focused ways and sought rights
that would be exercised by the news reporter rather than by her source.
a. Branzburg, Pappas, and Caldwell
The Branzburg case began in late 1969 when Paul Branzburg, a reporter
for Louisville's Courier-Journal, published an article revealing details about
local drug manufacturing and distributing.52 Branzburg had written the
article based on information obtained "during an interview granted to him
upon a pledge" that he would not reveal the identity of the drug producers.53
47. See Blasi, Newsman's Privilege, supra note 6, at 235 ("The press subpoena contro-
versy [was] in the courts ... largely because the sensitivity to each other's needs that
[previously] characterize[d] government-press relations [was, by 1971,] virtually nonexist-
ent.").
48. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
49. 408 U.S. at 709, aff'g In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971).
50. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708, rev'g Caldwell v. United States, 434 E2d 1081 (9th
Cir. 1970).
51. See Brief for the American Newspaper Guild et al. as Amicus Curiae, Branzburg,
408 U.S. 665 (Nos. 70-57, 70-94), 1971 WL 133339 [hereinafter Newspaper Guild Brief];
Brief for Amicus Curiae, the American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665
(Nos. 70-57, 70-85, 70-94), 1971 WL 133334; Brief of American Society of Newspaper Edi-
tors et al. as Amici Curiae, in Support of Earl Caldwell, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-57),
1971 WL 133332; Brief for Chicago Tribune Co. as Amicus Curiae, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665
(No. 70-57), 1971 WL 133340 [hereinafter Chicago Tribune Brief]; Brief of the New York
Times Co., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-57), 1971 WL
133333 [hereinafter National Media Brief]; Brief for Radio Television News Directors Ass'n,
as Amicus Curiae, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-57), 1971 WL 133335 [hereinafter News
Directors Brief]; Brief of the Washington Post Co. & Newsweek, Inc., as Amici Curiae, in
Support of Respondent, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-57), 1971 WL 133330 [hereinafter
Washington Post Brief].
52. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 345-46 (Ky. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Judge Pound was succeeded in office by Judge Hayes, the
named party in the case before the Supreme Court. 408 U.S. at 668 n.3.
53. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 346.
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Accordingly, when he was subsequently subpoenaed to appear before a local
grand jury, "Branzburg refused to disclose the identity of the men" who
were the sources of his story.54 Facing contempt charges, Branzburg asserted
a statutory and constitutional privilege against testifying but was denied
relief in his state's court of appeals.
55
Branzburg's troubles did not end there. Several months later, he was
subpoenaed again in relation to another story that he published about drug
activity in Frankfort, Kentucky.56 Again, Branzburg asserted a privilege to
protect the anonymous sources who had given him his story, 57 and again, he
was unsuccessful.58 Significantly, the state court explicitly avoided framing
the First Amendment issue as one of "the protection of the petitioner's
source of information"; rather, the question was focused on Branzburg him-
self-whether he, as a reporter, could "be required even to appear before the
grand jury.'
59
At roughly the same time, a photographer for a New Bedford, Massa-
chusetts television station was fighting a similar subpoena in that state's
court system. In 1970, Paul Pappas obtained access to a Black Panthers
meeting on the condition that he agree to keep his sources anonymous and
report only on the fact of the police raid.60 Pappas was later summoned to
appear before a grand jury but he refused to testify about certain matters,
arguing that revealing information would violate his First Amendment right
"to protect the source of information acquired in confidence."6 Again,
though, the litigating reporter 62 and the state court63 focused on the confi-
dential informants not as anonymous speakers per se but rather as sources of
news from which Pappas himself asserted a right to obtain information.
54. Id.
55. The state court ultimately relied solely on the construction of Kentucky's reporter's
privilege statute to reject Branzburg's claim that he was exempt from testifying. Pound, 461
S.W.2d at 346, 348. It found that Branzburg had "abandoned the claim of [F]irst [A]mendment
privilege," id. at 346 n.1, but the Supreme Court disagreed, Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 671 n.6.
56. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669-70.
57. Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748, 749 (Ky. 1971), aff'd sub noin. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
58. This time, the state court ruled on both the statutory and constitutional issues.
Meigs, 503 S.W.2d at 749-50.
59. Id. at 750; see also id. at 751 (holding that the reporter's interest in gathering news
did not outweigh the public's need for the evidence and rejecting "speculation" that requiring
the testimony would "inhibit[] his ability to obtain information").
60. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (Mass. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. at 299-300 (noting arguments centered on "the extent to which the First
Amendment [protects] news gatherers" and describing the argument that "to force a newsman
to testify... may impair the ability of a free press").
63. Id. at 302-03 (holding that "[a]ny effect on the free dissemination of news [would
be] indirect, theoretical, and uncertain" and finding "no constitutional newsman's privilege...
to refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury").
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Finally, in the last of the cases consolidated with Branzburg, a federal dis-
trict court judge held Earl Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, in
contempt for ignoring a grand jury subpoena. 64 Like Pappas, Caldwell had
been subpoenaed to testify about activities carried out by the Black Panthers
65
and refused on grounds that doing so would "destroy the relationship of trust"
with his source and hamper his constitutional right to newsgather.
66 When
Caldwell challenged his contempt citation before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the court accepted the reporter-focused argument, 67 overturned
Caldwell's contempt citation, and held that "[a]bsent compelling reasons for
requiring [a reporter's] testimony, he [is] privileged to withhold it."
68
Thus, when Branzburg and its companion cases reached the Court, no
one had formally presented or considered the issue of press subpoenas
through the lens of the anonymous-speech rights of the reporters' sources.
b. The Briefs' Focus on the Reporter
This primary focus on the journalist continued at the Supreme Court, as
the media companies that litigated Branzburg on behalf of their journalist
employees crafted briefs calculated to serve their long-term industry inter-
ests, 69 and as the amici-the lion's share of whom were other press entities
and industry advocates°--mirrored these approaches in their submissions to
the Court. The parties7 and their amici" focused on the newsgathering right
64. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1084.
67. Id. at 1085 ("[C]ompelled disclosure of information received by a journalist within
the scope of such confidential relationships jeopardizes those relationships and thereby im-
pairs the journalist's ability to gather, analyse, and publish the news." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
68. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679 (1972) (characterizing Caldwell's holding).
69. Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy, supra note 30, at 571 (describing the
motivations of newspapers as "legal instigators").
70. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 666-67 (listing organizations that filed amicus briefs); see
also supra note 51 (specifying the amicus briefs filed by press entities and industry advocates).
71. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Paul M. Branzburg at 3, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665
(No. 70-85), 1971 WL 133354, at *3 (framing the Question Presented as "[w]hether the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits a grand jury from compelling a
newspaper reporter to disclose confidential information"); id. at 9, 1971 WL 133354, at *9
("Newsgathering activities are essential to the effective functioning of a free press, and as such
are protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."); see also
Reply Brief at 8-9, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 (No. 70-94), 1970 WL 122436, at *8-9 ("The
gathering of news protected by the First Amendment is, at the very least, the right to be free
from governmental restraints and inhibitions which destroy the newsmen's confidential reta-
tionships and thus seriously restrict the information he obtains and that the public in turn is
entitled to receive.... The right to gather ... is... an intrinsic part of the entire process pro-
tected by the First Amendment under the general description, 'the freedom' ... of the press.'"
(final alteration in original) (emphasis added)).
72. See, e.g., Newspaper Guild Brief, supra note 51, at 6, 1971 WL 133339, at *6 ("A
free press cannot serve the basic purpose of the First Amendment, to enlighten the people,
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of the press and the associated right of the public to receive information.
The litigants consistently classified the relevant constitutional right as the
"right to gather news"73 and repeatedly cited the public-information role of
the press as the First Amendment value to be served.7 4 To the extent that
reporters were asserting rights as proxies for anyone else, it was on behalf of
the readers of their newspapers, not the sources who wished to remain
anonymous.
Amici supported this same approach, arguing that freedom of the press
must be honored in order to create an informed citizenry 75 and that "the
press cannot inform the people unless its newsmen can maintain communi-
cation with news sources. ' 76 The Branzburg briefing did not wholly fail to
acknowledge the Court's anonymous-speech jurisprudence.77 But even in the
instances in which the briefs affirmatively recognized the right to speak
anonymously78 or highlighted the concerns that sources might have in being
unless it is an informed press."); Chicago Tribune Brief, supra note 51, at 15, 1971 WL
133340, at *15 (arguing that the absence of a reporter's privilege results in "an invidious and
constant suppression of press freedom"); National Media Brief, supra note 51, at 25, 1971 WL
133333, at *25 ("[Off-the-record information obtained in confidence is of the utmost im-
portance to the performance of the reporter's function."); Washington Post Brief, supra note
51, at 8, 1971 WL 133330, at *8 (arguing that subpoenas for confidential information "seri-
ously impair or even destroy the ability of the news media to fulfill the unique role assigned to
them in the functioning of our democratic society").
73. E.g., Brief for Petitioner, Paul M. Branzburg, supra note 71, at 13, 1971 WL
133354, at *13 ("If the right to gather news is limited, then the right to a free press is corre-
spondingly limited."); id. at 17, 1971 WL 133354, at *17 ("By interfering with the
newsgathering process the state has made severe inroads on the fundamental freedoms guaran-
teed to the press ....").
74. E.g., id. at 13, 1971 WL 133354, at *13 ("[T]he right of the public to receive the
facts and information must be guarded... "); id. at 22, 1971 WL 133354, at *22 (arguing that
when reporters are forced to testify about anonymous communications, "the public loses an
important source of news" (emphasis added)).
75. Brief of the ACLU et al., Amici Curiae at 3-4, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) (No. 70-57), 1971 WL 133338, at *3-4 [hereinafter ACLU Brief]; see also Washington
Post Brief, supra note 51, at 15, 1971 WL 133330 , at *15 ("[G]athering the news is as much
protected by the First Amendment as is its dissemination. It is obvious that newsgathering
depends in large part upon information given to reporters in confidence ... ").
76. Newspaper Guild Brief, supra note 51, at 5, 1971 WL 133339, at *5; see also Na-
tional Media Brief, supra note 51, at 7, 1971 WL 133333, at *7 ("The right of the public to be
informed by print and electronic media, which is deeply rooted in the First Amendment, coin-
cides with a reporter's right of access to news sources .... ).
77. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Paul M. Branzburg, supra note 71, at 26, 1971 WL
133354, at *26 ("State action which deprives an individual of the right to speak anonymously
through the news media violates the First Amendment."); Washington Post Brief, supra note
51, at 18, 1971 WL 133330, at *18 ("Th[e] Court has repeatedly emphasized, in a variety of
contexts, the value of anonymity in the collection and dissemination of information.").
78. See Brief for Petitioner, Paul M. Branzburg, supra note 71, at 26-27, 1971 WL
133354, at *26-27 ("By compelling the testimony of... reporters concerning their inform-
ants, and thereby discouraging these informants from speaking out, the state deprives these
individuals of effective freedom of expression and the right to be heard."). Pappas's brief never
mentions anonymity at all. Reply Brief, supra note 71, at 8-9, 1970 WL 122436, at *8-9
(focusing exclusively on the newsgathering right).
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identified, 9 they did so in support of a First Amendment right for the re-
porter, arguing that many sources would speak to reporters only if given
assurances that their confidentiality would be protected
8 ° and that restricting
these speakers "restrict[ed] and limit[ed] the freedom of the press."
81
c. The Court's Focus on the Reporter
Given this overwhelming focus on newsgathering by both the lower
courts and the Branzburg briefs, it is unsurprising that the justices, too,
viewed the issue of a reporter's privilege almost exclusively through this
lens. The majority framed the petitioners' argument in only these terms,
stating at the outset that "[t]he heart of the claim [was] that the burden on
news gathering resulting from compelling reporters to disclose confidential
information outweigh[ed] any public interest in obtaining the information."
82
It noted that it had been "admonished that refusal to provide a First
Amendment reporter's privilege [would] undermine the freedom of the press
to collect and disseminate news, '8 3 and the Court's focus remained almost
entirely on the fact "that the privilege claimed [was] that of the reporter, not
the informant." 4
In refusing to acknowledge a First Amendment-based reporter's privilege
to protect anonymous sources, the majority stated that the need for effective
grand jury proceedings outweighed "the consequential, but uncertain, burden
on news gathering."85 Likewise, it rejected the notion that "the public interest
in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified sources
79. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Paul M. Branzburg, supra note 71, at 26-27, 1971
WL 133354, at *26-27 ("Jobs are threatened, economic security may be endangered, and
official state action is often a result of individual expressions of minority views."); ACLU
Brief, supra note 75, at 11-12, 1971 WL 133338, at *11-12 (suggesting that, in speaking
confidentially with reporters, political dissidents, low-level criminals, and government offi-
cials were "attempting to communicate their ideas to the public in an anonymous fashion").
80. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Paul M. Branzburg, supra note 71, at 9, 1971 WL
133354, at *9.
81. Id. at 20-21, 1971 WL 133354, at *20-21; see also ACLU Brief, supra note 75, at
11, 1971 WL 133338, at *11 (calling anonymous-speech protection "[a]nother set of estab-
lished doctrines ... bearing upon upholding a [reporter's] First Amendment right to refuse to
disclose confidential information").
82. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (emphasis added); see also id. at
679-80 ("[The reporters] press First Amendment claims that may be simply put: that to gather
news it is often necessary to agree either not to identify the source of information published or
to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both; that if the reporter is nevertheless forced to
reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source so identified and other confidential sources
of other reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information.. .
83. Id. at 698.
84. Id. at 695; see also id. at 682 ("This asserted burden on news gathering is said to
make compelled testimony from newsmen constitutionally suspect and to require a privileged
position for them.").
85. Id. at 690 (emphasis added).
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must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting
those crimes reported to the press by informants.
86
Although the narrow, five-justice majority in Branzburg held that the
Constitution did not give rise to a privilege for the journalists on the facts of
that case,87 Justice Powell concurred separately and appeared to express
sympathy for the very constitutional protections that the majority rejected. 8
Although less than clear in its contours, the concurrence did specifically
state that "the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances
where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection."89 This con-
currence thus provided media attorneys with ammunition for arguing that
"legitimate First Amendment interests require protection" in many confiden-
tial-source situations outside the grand jury setting at issue in Branzburg.9°
These arguments fairly quickly held sway in almost every federal appellate
court across the country.91 Sympathetic to the newsgathering needs of the
wildly popular press and buoyed by Justice Powell's suggestion that the dis-
sent's approach might sometimes be proper, nearly all federal courts came to
recognize some constitutional privilege for journalists in non-grand jury
cases. 92 Although support for this First Amendment-based qualified privi-
lege is arguably declining,93 and some have forecasted a trend away from
recognizing it, this post-Branzburg, dissent-based development remains the
strong majority position. 94 Thus, in real-world terms, the Branzburg dissent-
86. Id. at 695. Indeed, in one of the few instances in which the majority did reference
the anonymous-speech rights of sources, it minimized them by suggesting that "[tlhe prefer-
ence for anonymity of those confidential informants involved in actual criminal conduct is
presumably a product of their desire to escape criminal prosecution." Id. at 691. Though it
later acknowledged that there may be "situations where a source is not engaged in criminal
conduct:" id. at 693, the majority expressed doubt as to whether "the informer who prefers
anonymity but is sincerely interested in furnishing evidence of crime" would actually be de-
terred, id. at 695.
87. Id. at 665, 667.
88. See id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Court does not hold that newsmen,
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the
gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources.").
89. Id. at 710.
90. Id.; Lucy A. Dalglish & Casey Murray, Dgja Vu All Over Again: How a Generation
of Gains in Federal Reporter's Privilege Law Is Being Reversed, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 13, 19 (2006) ("[MIany subpoenaed reporters and their lawyers convinced courts all over
the country that Justice Powell's concurrence represented the true majority view.").
91. For a list of cases embracing the argument that a First Amendment qualified privi-
lege exists, see Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 346 & n. 111.
92. See John E. Osborne, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the Em-
pirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 67 (1985)
(outlining "the development of a flexible 'qualified' privilege" in the years after Branzburg).
93. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the widely
accepted reading of Branzburg giving rise to a qualified privilege).
94. See United States v. Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945 (E.D. Va. 2011) (applying a re-
porter's privilege to a journalist's refusal to respond to a subpoena for the name of a
confidential source and citing the strong majority reading of Branzburg as setting forth a qual-
ified privilege).
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ers, rather than the majority, set forth the meaningful First Amendment doc-
trine for federal courts95 on the question of the existence and contours of a
reporter's privilege.96
In recognizing a constitutional qualified reporter's privilege, the dissent-
ers-like the majority-accepted the journalist-focused doctrinal approach.
They argued that the First Amendment dictated a rule that reporters do not
have to respond to subpoenas asking them to "reveal confidences," but that
this qualified privilege would be overcome if the government
(1) show[ed] that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of the
law; (2) demonstrate[d] that the information sought cannot be obtained by
alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3)
demonstrate[d] a compelling and overriding interest in the information.97
The dissenters fully embraced the argument that a reporter possesses a "right
to gather news"98 and stressed the media's "constitutional mission" 99 in
declaring a reporter-based "right to a confidential relationship."" Although
far more willing than the majority to engage the case law on anonymous-
speech rights,' 0' the dissenters still invoked this doctrine only tangentially.
They saw the anonymous-speech rights as merely "analogous"'' 02 to the issue
at hand, and they portrayed actual anonymous speakers as relevant only
insofar as they "make information available through the press to the
public"'0 3 and have "relationships [with protected reporters that] are vital to
the free flow of information."'"
Thus, it was natural for federal circuit courts, taking their lead from the
Branzburg dissenters, to adopt an analytical framework focusing on the
rights of the reporter herself and not those of the individual to whom the
reporter had promised confidentiality.0 5
95. State courts have likewise created a privilege despite Branzburg's narrow rejection
of it. See Jones, Empirical Study, supra note 8, at 590 & nn.28-29 (discussing the develop-
ment of the privilege by state courts applying common law or federal or state constitutional
law).
96. Ugland, supra note 8, at 2 n.1 ("As a result [of Justice Powell's concurrence], many
lower federal courts have since recognized some form of the privilege, and many have en-
dorsed the criteria outlined in Justice Stewart's Branzburg dissent.").
97. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
98. Id. at 728.
99. Id. at 729.
100. Id. at 728.
101. See id. at 735 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63
(1958), and Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)).
102. Id. at735.
103. Id. at 730; see also id. at 744 (citing a need to "avoid deterrence of such sources").
104. Id. at 736.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Caporale, 806 F2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986)
("[I]nformation may only be compelled from a reporter claiming privilege if the party request-
ing the information can show that it is highly relevant...." (emphasis added)); LaRouche v.
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B. The Doctrinal Aftermath of Branzburg
In the forty years since Branzburg offered the reporter-focused qualified
constitutional privilege, judges,106 scholars, 107 and even journalists them-
selves '08 have repeatedly questioned the privilege's application and utility.
This doctrinal framework-although arguably producing positive societal
results and sustaining a culture of public-affairs reporting superior to what
would exist in the absence of any privilege at all-has also produced signifi-
cant complexity and confusion that warrants the exploration of alternative
doctrinal approaches. Though the decision is criticized on numerous
grounds,' °9 it is the twin intractable problems of definition and degree that
make Branzburg and its progeny a particularly hazardous framework for the
constitutional consideration of reporter-source relations. On the first of
these problems, an approach that considers only the newsgathering and pub-
lic-informing rights of the reporter creates an increasingly difficult and
constitutionally questionable need to define who is a reporter for purposes
of the privilege. 0 The second problem is that this approach also rises and
falls on the degree to which reporters meet their public-serving function and
need the privilege to continue to serve that function-issues that are thorny
as an analytical matter and impractical as an operational matter. A close in-
vestigation of Branzburg's foundations and of the ongoing analytical
NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) ("In determining whether the journalists'privilege
will protect the source in a given situation, it is necessary ... to balance the interests in-
volved." (emphasis added)); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583,
595 n.12 (Ist Cir. 1980) (noting that the rights are "lodged in the reporter and his publisher");
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[A] reporter has a
First Amendment privilege .... "); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979)
(acknowledging a "public policy giving newspaper reporters protection"); Farr v. Pitchess, 522
F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1975) (balancing the due process need for information with the
"right of the newsmen to keep secret a source of information" (emphasis added)); Baker v. F &
F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing "a journalist's right to protect confiden-
tial sources" (emphasis added)).
106. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (criticizing cases
that cite Branzburg in support of applying a reporter's privilege).
107. See supra notes 16-19.
108. See Free Flow of Information Act 2007: Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 29 (2007) [hereinafter Free Flow of Information Act
Hearing] (testimony of William Safire, Chairman, The Dana Foundation) ("I am here as a
journalist to testify from my real world that 'a chilling effect' ... is being felt by today's re-
porters and columnists."); id. at 103 (prepared statement of the National Association of
Broadcasters) ("It is myth to suggest that journalists will be able to unearth the information
they need from sources when they must explain the procedures of a grand jury proceeding and
a subpoena before every interview.").
109. See supra notes 16-19.
110. Compare Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025
(2011) (arguing for a narrow definition of the press and suggesting that the Press Clause is
best read to establish press exceptionalism), with Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an
Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
459 (2012) (arguing that the Press Clause does not secure any rights exclusive to members of
the organized media).
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debates that surround the case's application reveals the depth of these com-
plexities and underscores the need for a more stable alternative framework.
1. The Need to Define "Reporter"
By its very designation, a constitutional reporter's privilege applies only
to a "reporter," and thus mandates a threshold showing that the party seeking
the constitutional protection qualifies occupationally for the privilege. Even
assuming that this determination was one that could have fairly been made
four decades ago-an assumption the Branzburg majority flatly reject-
edl1 '-it is a task that has now become complicated to a degree of near
impossibility, 12 especially as technological changes have altered the prima-
ry mechanisms for gathering and disseminating news." 3
Because "[p]referential treatment of the press requires some definition
of the intended beneficiaries," it seems clear that "[i]n a world in which
many, if not most, business entities are information providers, it [will not
be] easy to determine which of them are press." ' 4 As "[e]stablished news
media are disappearing or morphing into forms indistinguishable from new
media that are anything but established,"' the Branzburg focus on the jour-
nalist has "led to a kind of definitional football over whether ... it is
possible to define the press with sufficient specificity and whether it is pru-
dent for one class of speaker to be preferred over another.""' 6 These
concerns of prudence and specificity resonate throughout the case law and
scholarship on this topic.
On the question of prudence, our most basic constitutional principles
seem to dictate that we avoid differentiating between categories of similarly
situated speakers, particularly on less than clear bases." 7 Even assuming
111. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703-04 (1972).
112. Indeed, it may become increasingly difficult to tell whether a party is a reporter or a
source. For example, when it accepted diplomatic cables and other information from an army
soldier, WikiLeaks took on the features of a reporter; when information from the site appeared in
the New York Times, WikiLeaks seemed more akin to a source. See Ginger Thompson,
Competing Portraits in WikiLeaks Case, N.Y TIMEs, Dec. 23, 2011, at AI5, http://
www.nytimes.con/201 1/12/23/us/hearing-in-private-mannings-wikileaks-case-ends.htm.
113. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's Privilege, 91
MINN. L. REV. 515, 516-17 (2007) ("[T]he development of the Internet and online publica-
tions have raised a host of new, perplexing questions about the purpose and scope of the
privilege.").
114. Anderson, supra note 27, at 435.
115. David A. Anderson, Confidential Sources Reconsidered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 903
(2009); see also Robert Kuttner, The Race: Newspapers Have a Bright Future as Print-Digital
Hybrids After All-But They'd Better Hurry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar./Apr. 2007, at 24
(discussing newspapers "with primarily online presence").
116. David Kohler, Self Help, the Media and the First Amendment, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1263, 1290 (2007) (emphasis added).
117. State v. Buchanan, 436 P.2d 729, 731 (Or. 1968) (en banc) ("[Ilit would be difficult to
rationalize a rule that would create special constitutional rights for those possessing credentials
as news gatherers which would not conflict with the equal-privileges and equal-protection
concepts also found in the Constitution."), quoted in Papandrea, supra note 113, at 574.
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that factors such as the social or democracy-enhancing value of the dissemi-
nated information could be used to limit the privilege,' 18 these content-based
determinations run the real risk of themselves violating the First Amend-
ment." 9 More to the point, a Court-declared delineation of this sort "as a
matter of First Amendment interpretation would fly in the face of more than
two hundred years of constitutional wisdom," because "[tihe idea of defin-
ing or 'licensing' the press in this manner is anathema to our constitutional
traditions.' ' 2 0 Thus, while perhaps expected and even appropriate when de-
signing the contours of a reporter's privilege as a statutory matter,'12 this
definitional line drawing is at best knotty as a basis for a constitutional doc-
trine.
On the question of specificity, judges faced with applications of the re-
porter's privilege have repeatedly bemoaned the "vexing nature of [the]
question" of who would be entitled to a reporter's privilege. 22 Judges have
noted, in particular, that "[t]he proliferation of communications media in the
modern world makes it impossible to construct a reasonable or useful defini-
tion of' a reporter.123 Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit outlined the
conundrum:
Are we then to create a privilege that protects only those reporters em-
ployed by Time Magazine, the New York Times, and other media giants,
or do we extend that protection as well to the owner of a desktop printer
producing a weekly newsletter to inform his neighbors, lodge brothers,
co-religionists, or co-conspirators? Perhaps more to the point today, does
118. See Papandrea, supra note 113, at 578 ("Some scholars have suggested that the
reporter's privilege should be available only to those who publish information involving mat-
ters of public concern ...."); Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial
Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 760 (1999) ("[Tjhe press's claim to freedom is strongest
when its speech is a product of a process of judgment that is ... grounded in a reasoned effort
to publish information ... judged useful and important for the maintenance of freedom in a
self-governing society.").
119. Note, Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV.
1450, 1607 (1985).
120. Geoffrey R. Stone, Essay, Why We Need a Federal Reporter's Privilege, 34 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 39, 47 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
121. Many state statutes extend protection only to those employed by, or otherwise con-
nected to, the institutional media. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070(a), (b) (West 2009); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015(l)(a) (2012); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-100 (Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (2000). Some statutes ex-
pressly extend a privilege to scholars and students. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320 (1999
& Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 9-112(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
Others focus on the functional work of the individual invoking the privilege. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.023 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2011).
122. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Sentelle, J., concurring).
123. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123, 140 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Report-
ers cannot be readily identified.... Without more definition for those entitled to invoke a
reporter's privilege... it can hardly be said that such a privilege would be certain or narrowly
drawn.").
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the privilege also protect the proprietor of a web log: the stereotypical
"blogger" sitting in his pajamas at his personal computer posting on the
World Wide Web his best product to inform whoever happens to
browse his way? If not, why not?
24
Faced with this technological moving target, scholars and jurists have
spilt gallons of ink setting forth proposed definitional approaches, ranging
from exceptionally narrow classifications that would essentially include on-
ly professional journalists at established traditional media outlets, 125 to very
broad ones that would extend the privilege to any person performing the
basic functions of a reporter.16 Some courts addressing the definitional issue
in "cases involving traditional media entities have been so worried about the
expansive scope of the privilege that they have been throwing the baby out
with the bathwater and refusing to recognize the privilege at all."'
27
It is no exaggeration to say that the "futility of trying to decide as a matter
of constitutional law who should have the right to protect confidential
sources" is "[t]he most compelling objection to" a constitutional reporter's
privilege with a Branzburg journalist focus. 128 All told, if the only
124. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 E3d at 1156-57 (Sentelle, J., con-
curring).
125. See Josh Gerstein, Bloggers Blur the Definition of Reporters' Privilege, N.Y.
SUN, Dec. 6, 2004, at 6 (quoting media attorney Floyd Abrams as saying "[i]f everybody's
entitled to the privilege, nobody will get it"); David Shaw, Media Matters: Do Bloggers
Deserve Basic Journalistic Protections?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at E14, http://
articles.lati mes.com/2005/mar/27/entertainment/ca-shaw27 ("[T]he nation's estimated 8
million bloggers are not entitled to the same constitutional protection as traditional
journalists-essentially newspaper, magazine, radio and television reporters and editors.").
126. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Academi-
cians ... should be accorded protection commensurate to that which the law provides for
journalists.... After all, scholars too are information gatherers and disseminators."); Shoen v.
Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Tihe critical question for deciding whether a
person may invoke the journalist's privilege is whether she is gathering news for dissemination
to the public."); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144-45 (2d. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he pro-
tection from disclosure may be sought by one not traditionally associated with the
institutionalized press .... "); Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of
Journalism to Protect the Journalist's Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39
Hous. L. REV. 1371, 1411 (2003) ("[A]ny individual engaged in journalism should be protect-
ed by journalists' shield laws."); Papandrea, supra note 113, at 519-20 ("Given ... the
purpose behind the reporter's privilege, the privilege should not be limited to those who are
serving as traditional journalists .... "); Dan Paul, Why a Shield Law?, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV.
459, 461 (1975) ("[I]t would be a terrible mistake to draw shield legislation so narrowly that it
would apply only to reporters."); Stone, supra note 120, at 51 (arguing that the answer to who
should be the beneficiary of a reporter's privilege "should be a functional one").
127. Papandrea, supra note 113, at 516.
128. Anderson, supra note 115, at 903; see also Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers,
and Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter's Privilege, 24 CARoOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 428 (2006) ("One of the most vexing challenges facing those who seek
to enact a privilege in our media-saturated age is deciding to whom the privilege should ap-
ply."); James Thomas Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, Enacting a Reasonable Federal Shield
Law: A Reply to Professors Clymer and Eliason, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1312 (2008) ("[T]he
Supreme Court could not draw lines consistent with the First Amendment where '[allmost any
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constitutional framework available for assessing the flow of confidential
information to the public is one that focuses on the reporter, the doctrine is
destined to be mired in definitional difficulties in at least some cases, and
likely in a growing number of them.
2. Difficulty of Weighing the Deterrence Factor and
Assessing the Necessary Scope of the Privilege
A related and equally difficult doctrinal snag in an approach that focuses
on the reporter is the analytically intrinsic need under such an approach to
determine the necessity and scope of the privilege. Would "[lt]he full flow of
information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee . . . be se-
verely curtailed if no protection ... were afforded to the process by which
news is assembled and disseminated?" '129 Or would the absence of a report-
er-based privilege in fact pose no "impediment to the free flow of
information" of a degree that would justify the costs of the privilege? 3°
As discussed above, 3' the arguments built by the litigants in Branzburg,
which formed the foundation of the qualified reporter-focused privilege that
emerged after that case, had several component parts. Under this framework,
the true value to be served is availability to the public of information about
matters of import. In order for the privilege as constituted post-Branzburg to
be mandated by the First Amendment, it must be the case that the absence of
the privilege impedes public dissemination of that information-that is, that
without the privilege, sources will not speak to reporters and reporters will
not convey matters of import to the public. The difficulty of making each of
these judgments is significant. Indeed, it was the core hurdle that the
Branzburg majority could not clear. The majority was openly skeptical in its
assessment, saying that it "remain[ed] unclear how often and to what extent
informers are actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen
are forced to testify before a grand jury," and suggesting that the "evidence
fail[ed] to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the
flow of news to the public" in the absence of a constitutional privilege.'32
Noting that "[e]stimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the
willingness of informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely diver-
gent and to a great extent speculative," the majority found that "[r]eliance by
the press on confidential informants does not mean that all such sources will
in fact dry up because of the later possible appearance of the newsman be-
fore a grand jury."'33
author' could make a claim to the need for the free flow of information by protecting their
confidential sources." (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972))).
129. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
130. Reporters' Privilege Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16 (2006) [hereinafter Law En-
forcement Hearing] (statement of Steven D. Clymer, Professor, Cornell Law School).
131. See supra Section I.A.2.
132. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693.
133. Id. at 693-94.
1242 [Vol. I111: 1221
Rethinking Reporter's Privilege
Post-Branzburg, the debates over these questions of necessity and degree
have raged on in courts, 3 4 in Congress,'35 and among scholars. 3 6 Supporters
of the privilege insist that anecdotal evidence, common sense, and at least
some empirical data all suggest that the privilege is vital to our system of in-
vestigative and watchdog reporting. 137 They believe that without such
protection for journalists, sources will in fact "dry up,"' 38 chilling critically
important speech on governmental and societal matters. 3 9 Opponents ar-
gue the exact opposite: that both historical experience and common sense
134. Eliason, supra note 128, at 395 ("The Circuit Courts of Appeal are in disarray ...
over the extent to which a privilege exists."); Jones, Empirical Study, supra note 8, at 591-93
(chronicling the tension between McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003), and
courts that have adopted comparatively "journalist-friendly readings of Branzburg").
135. Jones, Empirical Study, supra note 8, at 586 ("For more than thirty years, a legisla-
tive battle has raged over the need for a federal shield law for journalists."); Robert D. Lystad,
Anatomy of a Federal Shield Law: The Legislative and Lobbying Process, COMM. LAW.,
Summer 2005, at 3, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
communicationsjlawyer/2005/summer_2005.authcheckdam.pdf (outlining the major histori-
cal and contemporary congressional attempts to pass a federal shield law).
136. Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 321 n.14, 323 (discussing extensive
scholarship on reporter's privilege).
137. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1170 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (Tatel, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[S]pecial counsel presumes that leaks will go
on with or without the privilege.... [Tlhe available evidence suggests the special counsel is
wrong."); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 84-85 (1975) ("Forcing
reporters to divulge ... confidences would dam the flow to the press, and through it to the
people, of the most valuable sort of information ...."); Rachel Smolkin, Uncharted Terrain,
AM. JOURNALISM REV., Oct./Nov. 2005, at 32, 34 ("Confidential sources and newsrooms have
noticed [subpoenas to journalists], and what has resulted is a chilling effect .... Confidential
sources have retreated, newsrooms have become wary and the free flow of information to the
public has been impoverished." (quoting a position paper that the Newspaper Association of
America circulated on Capitol Hill)).
138. Comm. on Commc'ns & Media Law, Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y.C., The Federal
Common Law of Journalists' Privilege: A Position Paper, 60 RECORD 214, 225, 227 (2005)
("[W]ithout the ability of reporters to use these types of sources, many stories would have
gone unreported.... Important information the public relies upon would simply dry up.");
Dalglish & Murray, supra note 90, at 14 ("If [reporters] are perceived as being an agent of
discovery for a plaintiff, a prosecutor, or a defendant, who will trust them? Ultimately, sources
will dry up and journalists will not be able to do their jobs."); Lori Robertson, Kind of Confi-
dential, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June/July 2007, at 26, 33 (quoting Lance Williams, a San
Francisco Chronicle investigative reporter who was threatened with jail time for refusing to
respond to a subpoena, as saying, "If we don't get a shield law, it will eventually shut down
sources" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139. Free Flow of Information Act Hearing, supra note 108, at 13 (statement of Rep.
Mike Pence) ("Without the promise of confidentiality, many important conduits of
information about our [g]overnment will be shut down."); see also Jones, Empirical Study,
supra note 8, at 666 ("Subpoenas to the media are issued with some regularity; they are not
limited to the media organizations or the substantive issues involved in the highest-profile
recent cases; and, at least in some categories, they appear to be on the increase."); Jones,
Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 393 ("The breadth and depth of the qualitative and
quantitative data demonstrate that both the threat and the reality of subpoenas alter behaviors
in newsrooms of all sizes.").
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suggest that the privilege is largely unnecessary, 40 and that the empirical
data is at best inconclusive and at worst indicates that no reporter's privi-
lege is required for effective investigative newsgathering to continue.'
4'
Given that the analysis requires "prov[ing] the negative"- 4 2-that in the
absence of the privilege, fewer sources with socially valuable information
come forward and fewer reporters endeavor to do meaningful investigative
work-the challenge of knowing which group has the better argument is a
considerable one.
Thus, on the questions of whether a reporter-based privilege is necessary
to ensure the flow of public information and if so, to what degree, there ap-
pear to be only two true grounds for agreement: that "none of these things is
readily measurable"1 43 and that the seemingly necessary determinations are
"daunting"" or "well-nigh impossible"'145 for courts to make with any pre-
cision, as courts are institutionally "ill-suited" to such tasks.
146
Combined, the definitional difficulties and inherent speculation about
the necessity of the privilege and degree of protection required to serve its
constitutional goals have led to divisions of opinion among lower courts
147
and have made the exclusively reporter-focused approach to the protection
of material from anonymous sources doctrinally unstable.
140. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698-99 (1972) (rejecting the argument
that "refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter's privilege will undermine the freedom of
the press to collect and disseminate news" by noting that historically, without a privilege, "the
press has flourished"); Law Enforcement Hearing, supra note 130, at 16 (statement of Steven
D. Clymer, Professor, Cornell Law School) (arguing that the "impediment to the free flow of
information" without a privilege is "a hard case to make" and that "people are going to make
leaks whether or not there is Federal protection for anonymous sources"); 153 CONG. REC.
27,301 (2007) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) ("[F]or 200 years in this Nation, the press, in
fact, has flourished [without a privilege]. Information has flowed freely."); Douglas E. Lee, Do
Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: The Reporter's Privilege Today, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 77, 97 (2006) (citing use of confidential sources for stories on Watergate, the Clinton
impeachment, and the Enron and Abu Ghraib scandals as "logical inconsistencies in the
'chilling effect' argument").
141. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Journalist's Privilege-A Skeptic's View, 32 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 467, 468 (2006) (highlighting the "weak empirical foundations" for the privilege
and arguing that "the extreme consequences [press advocates] forecast were the privilege to be
denied seem most unlikely to eventuate"); Eliason, supra note 128, at 417-18 ("[V]irtually
every judicial and academic discussion concerning the privilege proceeds from the assumption
that this 'chilling effect' exists .... [I]t is impossible to prove empirically.").
142. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 128, at 1321-22.
143. Ugland, supra note 8, at 45-46.
144. Wen Ho Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 401 F Supp. 2d 123, 139-40 (D.D.C. 2005); see
also BeVier, supra note 141, at 475-76 ("[W]e are simply awash in indeterminacy about the
impact that recognizing or not recognizing a reporter's privilege would actually have.").
145. Wen Ho Lee, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 139; see also Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 128, at
1321-22 ("[Y]ou can try to measure it, but empirically it is virtually an impossible task ... .
146. Wen Ho Lee, 401 F Supp. 2d at 139.
147. See Eliason, supra note 128, at 395-96 (describing varying approaches in different
circuits).
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C. The Risks of Instability in Reporter's Privilege Doctrine
Instability in this area of the law is deeply problematic, and not merely
because it is inconvenient to have governing standards that are less than tidy
doctrinally. In the realm of expressive freedoms, clarity is crucial. Particu-
larly when, as is the case with the reporter's privilege, the doctrinal dividing
line marks the difference between constitutional protection on the one hand
and punishment-in the form of a contempt citation, fine, or jail time-
arising out of expressive activity on the other, we should expect this line to
be precise enough that the relevant actors can understand what conduct is
protected and what conduct is not.'48 Freedoms of expression are "delicate
and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society," and because
"[t]he threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions, 1 49 precision and intelligibility in the govern-
ing standard are essential.
Courts and scholars have long recognized these risks under the post-
Branzburg approach. Indeed, whatever else can normatively be said about
the need for or desirability of a privilege, it is undoubtedly true that both
practical considerations and the demands of the First Amendment dictate
that the relevant players have a sure knowledge as to whether the privilege
does or does not exist in a given information-gathering circumstance. 50 Un-
certainty of application of the constitutional reporter's privilege "leads to
confusion by sources and reporters, and the specter of jail and other harsh
penalties for reporters who do not know what promises they can make to
their sources when engaged in newsgathering."'15 1 Likewise, when would-be
anonymous speakers "are making difficult decisions about whether to put
themselves at risk by revealing information of significant value to the pub-
lic, clear rules are essential."'52
Branzburg's reporter focus does not provide this clear guidance. Federal
courts of appeals, struggling with "a standard which is fraught with
'imponderables and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full
148. Indeed, courts hold legislatures to precisely this standard in the statutory context,
striking legislation as void for vagueness when people "of common intelligence must neces-
sarily guess at its meaning" Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), because
vague laws restricting speech run the grave risk of chilling constitutionally protected speech,
see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
149. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
150. See Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings on S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 750,
S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128, and S. J. Res. 8 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 362 (1973) (testimony of Paul Branzburg, Newspaper
Reporter, Detroit Free Press) ("[R]eporters need certainty when dealing with informants. A
source wants to know with precision whether or not the reporter can be forced to reveal his
identity.").
151. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, Cooper v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150
(2005) (No. 04-1508), 2005 WL 1123536, at *9-10.
152. Stone, supra note 120, at 45 (emphasis omitted).
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exercise of First Amendment freedoms,' "153 have issued decisions on the
scope and applicability of the privilege that, understandably, are
"inconsistent, uncertain and irreconcilable."' 5 4 Because the reporter-focused
privilege grew out of a generous reading of a concurrence, and, even more
significantly, because it came laden with ongoing unknowables as to
definition and degree, a reporter might not know if she actually possesses
the qualified, contingent right in a particular circumstance. 15 5 It should come
as little surprise, then, that this "phantom privilege"' 56 has created "chaos in
the lower federal courts about the extent to which the First Amendment
embodies a journalist-source privilege."' 57 Reporters and their sources find
themselves governed by a "patchwork of differing privilege rules depending
on the jurisdiction in which they are subpoenaed," which leads to "arbitrary
and conflicting outcomes."'58
The uncertainty has become particularly apparent in the wake of what
some have described as a recent pushback against the logic of the Branzburg
dissent and against the overarching validity of a constitutional reporter's
privilege. 15 9 Judges are questioning the privilege more closely,160 and a se-
ries of notable cases in the last several years has cast journalists in the losing
role in privilege disputes in federal courts.' 61 Although many of these cases
have involved grand jury proceedings and thus were doctrinally predictable
losses under Branzburg, some commentators suggest that "the sheer weight
153. News Directors Brief, supra note 51, at 3, 1971 WL 133335, at *3 (quoting Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
154. Brief Amici Curiae of the State of Oklahoma et al. in Support of Petitioners at 7,
Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005) (Nos. 04-1507, 04-1508), 2005 WL 1317523, at
*7.
155. See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
156. Tony Pederson, Warming Up to the Idea of a Shield Law, NEWS MEDIA & L., Win-
ter 2005, at 8.
157. Stone, supra note 120, at 45.
158. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15 1, at 26, 2005 WL 1123536, at *26; see
also Stone, supra note 120, at 45 ("The current state of affairs leaves sources, joumalists,
prosecutors, and lower federal courts without any clear guidance, and the scope of the First
Amendment-based journalist-source privilege differs significantly from one part of the nation
to another.").
159. See, e.g., Dalglish & Murray, supra note 90, at 39 (arguing that "the media has lost
much of the ground it gained since Branzburg" and forecasting a possible "end to any judicial
respect afforded to a federal reporter's privilege developed under the First Amendment").
160. See, e.g., id.
161. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 E
Supp. 2d I 111 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Wen Ho Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 287 E Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C.
2003), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Jones, Empiri-
cal Study, supra note 8, at 615 ("Beginning in approximately 2002, a firestorm of headlines
emerged as reporters' battles-and ultimate losses-were placed in the public spotlight in a
way that had not been seen for at least three decades.").
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of negative precedent may make it increasingly difficult for journalists to
defend the privilege even when the facts are more in their favor."'
6 2
Operating in this band of legal ambiguity, 63 journalists report that they
perceive their environment to be tentative and risky.'64 Parties to recent
cases, 65 scholars, 66 and proponents who have testified before Congress
seeking supplemental protection through a better-defined statutory privi-
lege167 all have strongly asserted that the result of ambiguity in this area is a
chilling effect that is "as inimical to the principles of the First Amendment
as direct censorship by the state."'168 Not knowing if the protection exists, the
argument goes, reporters and their sources will err on the side of caution and
assume that it does not, 69 thus shutting down speech that otherwise would
and should flow freely.
The dynamic is made all the more complicated by the existence of often-
very-strong reporter's privilege statutes at the state level. States enact these
statutes with a plain goal of preserving the flow of information to the public
through confidential sources. But the efficacy of even the most protective of
162. Anthony L. Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, Jailed
Journalists and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist's Privilege, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 1063, 1111 (2006).
163. See id. ("[T]he ad hoc nature of privilege law since 1972 has made it less than pre-
dictable....").
164. Brief Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc., et al. in Support of Petitioners at 5, Miller v. Unit-
ed States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005) (Nos. 04-1507, 04-1508), 2005 WL 1199075, at *5
[hereinafter ABC Brief (Miller)] ("Today, reporters and their potential sources operate in a far
more uncertain and risky environment as a result of the approach to the reporters' privilege
taken by the federal courts... ,'); Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 375 ("Both quan-
titative and qualitative data signal a deep discouragement on the part of editors and news
directors, who .... overwhelmingly perceive that ... courts have become less protective of
the media, prosecutors and civil litigants have become more willing to subpoena the press, and
the frequency with which subpoenas are issued to news organizations has increased.").
165. E.g., Brief of Appellants Judith Miller, Matthew Cooper and Time, Inc. at 46, In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (Nos. 04-3138, 04-3139, and 04-3140),
2004 WL 4957264, at *46.
166. Reporters' Privilege Legislation: Issues and Implications: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 164-65 (2005) [hereinafter Issues and Implications
Hearing] (prepared statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor, University of Chicago Law
School); Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 128, at 1321-22.
167. Free Flow of Information Act Hearing, supra note 108, at 64 (testimony of Jim
Taricani, Investigative Reporter, WJARJNBCI0 Providence, New Bedford, R.I.) ("Sending
reporters to prison for protecting their sources results in a chilling effect on the press."); id. at
29 (testimony of William Satire, Chairman, The Dana Foundation) ("Believe me, when a jour-
nalist is threatened with jail or, indeed, is jailed for refusing to blow the whistle on a
whistleblower or to betray a trusting source, he or she feels a coercive chill.").
168. Brief for Petitioner, Paul M. Branzburg, supra note 71, at 23, 1971 WL 133354, at
*23.
169. Issues and Implications Hearing, supra note 166, at 29 (statement of Geoffrey R.
Stone, Professor, University of Chicago Law School) ("The more uncertainty that exists in
whether or not a privilege will in fact be honored, the greater the reluctance on the part of the
source to come forward with the information, and ... then many sources, perhaps most
sources, will simply say the better part of wisdom is to remain silent.").
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state legislative privileges is heavily undercut by the existence of an unclear
or difficult-to-administer federal constitutional scheme. 70 The uncertainty
of the reporter-based federal constitutional doctrine "frustrates and defeats
the nearly unanimous policies of the States in this area."17' Thus, once again,
"the degree to which confidential sources could be protected [is] rendered
uncertain, thereby lessening the likelihood that such sources will cooperate
and undercutting the very benefit to the public [that virtually all states]
sought to bestow through [their] shield law[s].'
172
Reporters argue that the major harms produced from all this confusion
are harms to the public. 173 "Journalists who fear that they may be subpoe-
naed to testify or give up their notes, forcing them to choose between their
professional ethics or risk going to jail, may decline to do certain types of
stories"' 74-especially those "derived from confidential sources likely to be
sought by prosecutors or civil litigants"' 7 5-and ultimately it is the public
that will be robbed of the newsworthy materials that it might have received.
When potential sources, aware of the confused state of affairs on the privi-
lege, are "deterred from speaking to the press,'1 76 it is the public that does
not hear the information that they have to offer. Thus, the sum total of these
incentives is a "barrier to the free flow of information to the public.'
1 77
Plainly, there is First Amendment value in newsgathering. The American
press plays a critical role in educating, informing, and enlightening the pop-
170. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 151, at 26, 2005 WL 1123536, at *26 ("In
the end, differing standards defeat the very purpose of the privilege, as a state-law privilege is
of little value if it offers no reliable protection from forced disclosure in federal court.").
171. Id. at 9, 2005 WL 1123536, at *9; see also Jones, Empirical Study, supra note 8, at
656 ("When a reporter engages in newsgathering and is faced with the question of whether to
promise confidentiality, she .... cannot know what legal standard might ultimately operate
upon that moment. In the absence of a federal privilege, even a reporter operating under a state
shield law with an absolute privilege can make no guarantees to sources at the times in which
those guarantees are sought.").
172. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F Supp. 2d 457, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), quoted in
Brief Amici Curiae of the State of Oklahoma et al., supra note 154, at 5, 2005 WL 1317523, at
*5.
173. Free Flow of Information Act Hearing, supra note 108, at 64 (2007) (statement of
j- Tqicni. Investigative Reporter, WJAR/NBCI0 Providence, New Bedford, R.I.) ("Every
time a reporter or news organization doesn't do a story because of fear of being held in crimi-
nal contempt, it is the public that loses."); see also ABC Brief (Miller), supra note 164, at 5,
2005 WL 1199075, at *5 (arguing that the "uncertainty" in the reporter's privilege "threatens
to jeopardize the flow of information to the public").
174. Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist's Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in
States with Shield Laws, 4 COMM. L. & POL'Y 325, 328 (1999); see also Free Flow of Infor-
mation Act Hearing, supra note 108, at 106 (letter from Denise A. Cardman, Acting Director,
American Bar Association) ("[T]he absence of a clearly defined federal reporters' privilege is
affecting ... editorial decisions, which in turn affects the free flow of information to the pub-
lic.").
175. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 128, at 1323.
176. Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999).
177. Free Flow of Information Act Hearing, supra note 108, at 89 (statement of Rep.
Mike Pence).
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ulace. 78 Its efforts to investigate and report on social trends, government
actions, and democratic decisionmaking are constitutionally vital.179 But, in
light of the doctrinal complexities just discussed, two points bear emphasis:
First, a constitutional analysis of the reporter-source dynamic that focuses
on the reporter's newsgathering right has proven incapable of fully serving
that newsgathering right or of meeting the larger goal of preserving the flow
of important information to the public. Second, newsgathering is not the
only First Amendment value implicated by that reporter-source dynamic. As
demonstrated in the next section, the anonymous-speech rights of the speak-
er also deserve fuller consideration and protection.
II. AN ANONYMOUS-SPEECH ANALYSIS
A generation ago, the Supreme Court in Talley v. California made explicit
something that had long been presumed about our First Amendment jurispru-
dence: in addition to having a freedom to speak, we also have a freedom not
to disclose our identity when we do so.'80 The Talley Court noted that "[t]he
obnoxious press licensing law of England, which was also enforced on the
Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the names of
printers, writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature crit-
ical of the government."'' It emphasized that the right to speak anonymously
was a vital component of our democracy because "[p]ersecuted groups and
sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppres-
sive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all."'' 82 In subsequent
opinions, Supreme Court justices have stressed both that the Framers consid-
ered a right to speak without identifying oneself to be foundational 183 and
178. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (discussing the role that newsgatherers play as "surrogates for the public"
and the ways in which the press contributes to "public understanding of the rule of law" (quot-
ing Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492
(1975) ("Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of our represent-
atives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of
government generally.").
179. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) ("A broadly defined freedom of the
press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society.").
180. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960); see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure
of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective ... restraint on
freedom of association ... "); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945) ("We think a
requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech . . . is quite
incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment.").
181. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 370-71 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he Framers in 1791 believed anonymous speech
sufficiently valuable to deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights.").
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that it continues to be a fundamental right housed within the First Amend-
ment's Speech Clause.
184
The constitutional protection of anonymous speakers should be the
primary doctrinal focus in cases of anonymous speech to reporters. 185 This
Part sets forth the theoretical foundation already established by the Supreme
Court for protection of speakers who desire anonymity, the risks associated
with acknowledging a strong right of anonymous speech, and the balance
the Court has struck in favor of speakers in this area. Part III will then
discuss the ways in which this anonymous-speech doctrine, which has
heretofore been focused on other factual settings, could be applied in
relatively seamless fashion to establish a speaker-focused protection of news
sources who wish to remain confidential. Given the probability of third-party
standing, this approach would retain the ability of newsgathering
organizations to protect First Amendment values, as they assert the
anonymous-speech rights of their sources. But it also would allow for the
consideration of critically important First Amendment values beyond the
newsgathering value and would largely eliminate the uncertainties and
complexities that have plagued the reporter-focused post-Branzburg
approach. In preparation for that discussion, this Part articulates additional
underlying values that the Court itself has found are safeguarded through
recognition of the anonymous-speech right. An understanding of these
values-and of the central First Amendment doctrines that have animated
the development of the anonymous-speech right-will demonstrate that
grounding the confidential-source inquiry in the more stable anonymous-
speech doctrine (1) would better align the constitutional analysis to the
fuller Speech Clause issues at stake in the confidential-source situation,
and (2) would invite courts to apply a clearer constitutional framework with
which they already have expertise.
A. Anonymous-Speech Doctrine
In articulating the doctrinal contours of the right to speak anonymously,
the Supreme Court has stressed the First Amendment value of ensuring a
flow of information to the public. 186 This emphasis makes clear that the
anonymous-speech right exists, at least in part, to meet the same important
societal ends that the post-Branzburg reporter's privilege seeks to meet. 187
184. Id. at 342 (majority opinion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,64 (1976) (per curiam).
185. This Article focuses exclusively on this anonymous-source context. Other rights
that have sometimes been bundled under the generic term "reporter's privilege"-including
the right not to turn over notes or other newsgathering materials not generated through any
confidential relationship-may well prove worthy of protection under other constitutional
considerations but are analytically distinct from the source-speech right that is the focus here.
186. See, e.g., MchItyre, 514 U.S. at 357; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
187. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 715 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("[E]ffective self-government cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady,
robust, unimpeded, and uncensored flow of opinion ...."); id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
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That is, both approaches recognize and are driven by what might be called
"public-information" values. But the anonymous-speech approach also rec-
ognizes and is driven by what might be called "individual-liberty" values.
An investigation of the development and operation of the anonymous-
speech doctrine plainly demonstrates the wider scope of First Amendment
values served by the anonymous-speech right-and the clearer position that
such a right occupies within the First Amendment framework.
Public-information values have been carefully enunciated by the
Court in anonymous-speech cases. When the Court first set forth
the anonymous-speech doctrine in Talley, the historical argument in support of
anonymous-speech protection was centered on a free-flow-of-information
premise: the First Amendment must protect anonymous distributions of
literature in order to ensure that certain literature will in fact be distributed. 1
88
The petitioner in Talley was a civil rights activist who had distributed
unsigned handbills in Los Angeles calling for a boycott of merchants that he
claimed sold goods manufactured by companies that discriminated against
minorities in hiring.'89 When charged under a city ordinance forbidding the
distribution of anonymous handbills,190 Talley challenged the law as an
unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech.' 9'
Writing for a six-three majority, Justice Black agreed that the ordinance
was void on its face and stressed the importance of anonymous speech in
ensuring dialogue on "public matters of importance."' 92 Explaining that the
Court had long recognized that "identification and fear of reprisal might
deter perfectly peaceful discussions,"'93 the Talley Court stated that there
could "be no doubt that [the] identification requirement would tend to re-
strict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of
expression."'' 94 Setting forth numerous examples of ways in which anony-
mous communications "played an important role in the progress of
mankind"' 95-including the publication of the constitutionally foundation-
al Federalist Papers under fictitious names196-the Court observed, "It is
("The reporter's constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his source stems from
the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of information to the public.").
188. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65.
189. The handbills contained only the name "National Consumers Mobilization" and a
post office box address. Id. at 61.
190. Id. The ordinance, Section 28.06 of the Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles,
provided, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under
any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and
address of [the author or distributor]." Id. at 60-61.
191. Id. at 62.
192. Id. at 65.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 64.
195. Id. at 64-65.
196. Id. at 65; see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 n.6
(1995) (listing other influential authors who wrote without identifying themselves).
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plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive
purposes."197
Thirty-five years later in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,19 the
Court reaffirmed Talley's vibrant protection of anonymous speech when it
declared unconstitutional 199 a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous
campaign literature.20 The Court held that "[a]n author generally is free to
decide whether or not to disclose his or her true identity." 0' 1 The McIntyre
Court found that a citizen who distributed handbills at public meetings
opposing a school tax referendum and signed them "CONCERNED
PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS," rather than with her own name,0 2 had a
constitutional right to do so, notwithstanding the state's countervailing
interests in helping voters assess validity and reduce fraud. 03 The provision
of the Ohio Code forbidding anonymous speech was struck as
unconstitutional, 204 with the Court again insisting that under the First
Amendment, speaking anonymously "is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice,
but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. 2 5 It underscored the
public-information values of anonymous speech by citing the long tradition of
influential authors writing anonymously or pseudonymously-including Mark
Twain, 0. Henry, Benjamin Franklin, Voltaire, George Eliot, and Charles
Dickens2°6-and by noting the importance of ensuring that information is not
self-censored when speakers fear "economic or official retaliation," "social
ostracism," or loss of privacy.
207
Thus, the Court squarely recognized that protection of anonymous speech
advances the First Amendment's public-information goals of encouraging
community-serving information and increasing the contributions willingly
made to the marketplace of ideas.20 8 First Amendment scholars and jurists
197. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
198. 514 U.S. at 334.
199. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
200. Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Revised Code provided, in relevant part, that
"[n]o person shall write, print, post, or distribute ... a notice, placard, dodger, advertise-
ment, sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is designed to promote
the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the adoption or defeat of
any issue, or to influence the voters in any election, or make an expenditure for the purpose
of financing political communications ... unless there appears on such form of publication in
a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement the name and residence or business
address of [the author or head of issuing organization]." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
201. Id. at 341.
202. Id. at 337.
203. Id. at 348-53.
204. Id. at 357.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 341 & n.4.
207. Id. at 341-42.
208. See id. at 342 ("[T]he interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of
ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of
entry.").
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have noted that removing barriers to the flow of information has the large-
scale societal benefits of enriching discourse209 and enhancing democratic
self-governance .2 l It is the way that the First Amendment serves the many
by protecting the one.
Importantly, though, the case law makes clear that this set of public-
information values represents only half of the dual purposes served by
protecting anonymity in communications. Constitutional protection of
anonymous speech also advances the First Amendment's individual-liberty
goals, facilitating the overarching "purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and
of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant
society."21' The freedom to speak anonymously, in other words, is designed
to serve the one even when it does not serve the many, by acting as "a shield
from the tyranny of the majority."212 It appears that the Court's motivation
for protecting anonymous speech has thus gone beyond eliminating obsta-
cles to individual communication of publicly useful information, and has
additionally embraced the self-fulfillment and individual-autonomy goals of
the First Amendment" 3 "by enabling individuals to explore new ideas, new
means of expression, and even new identities" and by allowing some speak-
ers simply to "derive internal satisfaction from not having their true identity
revealed." '14 This protection allows a speaker to ensure that readers will not
209. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1537, 1574 (2007) (arguing that anonymous-speech protec-
tion leads to the "inclusion of voices in public debate that might not otherwise be heard").
210. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (calling free speech the
mechanism that the Framers chose to "improve our society and keep it free"); N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting "a profound national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (remarking that free discussion is "essential to the secu-
rity of the Republic" and a "fundamental principle of our constitutional system"); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1948) ("[T]he
principle of the freedom of speech is derived ... from the necessities of self-government
..... "); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 883 (1963) ("The crucial point ... is not that freedom of expression is politically useful,
but that it is indispensable to the operation of a democratic form of government.").
211. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251,
259 (2011) (arguing that the "most appealing" First Amendment theory views "the constitu-
tional status of free speech as required respect for a person's autonomy in her speech
choices"); Emerson, supra note 210, at 879-81 (describing the "individual self-fulfillment"
theory that man "finds his meaning and his place in the world" through the development of the
powers of thought and expression, and that suppression of expression is thus "an affront to the
dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature"); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 209, at
1568 ("Anonymous speech is sometimes said to promote individual autonomy and self-
fulfillment... .").
214. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 209, at 1568-69 (footnote omitted).
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prejudge her message simply because they like or dislike its proponent,215
and thus works a direct, individual-liberty benefit upon the speaker herself.
In recognizing these ways in which anonymous speech is valuable in
preserving individual liberty of expression, the McIntyre Court gave an ad-
ditional doctrinal justification for finding government interference with
anonymity unconstitutional: it is strongly analogous to content control.216
Decades of First Amendment jurisprudence have firmly established that
content-based regulations of speech ordinarily receive strict scrutiny.217 Un-
less the government can prove that a content-based regulation on speech is
the least restrictive means of meeting a compelling governmental interest,
the regulation will fail constitutional review.
218
Writing for the Court in McIntyre, Justice Stevens noted that govern-
mental demands for a speaker's name run entirely afoul of this foundational
First Amendment command in both a theoretical and a practical way. First,
identification requirements essentially force the speaker to reveal "the con-
tent of her thoughts on a controversial issue,' 219 thus forcing the conveyance
of content that the speaker did not wish to convey and conflicting with the
essential theoretical underpinnings of the prohibition on content-based regu-
lation. Second, and more concretely, such requirements literally force the
inclusion of additional text-the speaker's name-when the speaker had
made the editorial judgment to exclude it. 220 "Accordingly," Justice Stevens
wrote, "an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions con-
cerning the omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an
aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment."22'
McIntyre thus reinforced the individual-liberty values at stake in a decision
to speak anonymously and cemented the right to speak anonymously as a
logical, even necessary, component of the most foundational of First
Amendment doctrines.
Although Talley and McIntyre are widely regarded as the core cases on
the central question of the anonymous-speech right, the Court has recog-
nized variations of the right in a number of other contexts, including cases
215. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
216. See id. at 357.
217. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) ("[T]he Constitution de-
mands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid, and that the Government
bear the burden of showing their constitutionality." (citations omitted)); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (a regulation that "prohibits speech on the basis of
its content" receives strict scrutiny); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116-18 (1991) (a law "directed only at works with a speci-
fied content" receives strict scrutiny).
218. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 774-75.
219. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 355.
220. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 209, at 1543 ("In essence, the [McIntyre] Court treated
the decision to remain anonymous as an editorial judgment like any other, which makes
choosing to omit one's name no different than choosing to omit an opposing viewpoint or to
include serial commas.").
221. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
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in which groups or their members were required to disclose their member-
ships222 and cases in which speakers were required to obtain named permits
before engaging in their communicative activity or were required to wear
identification badges while engaging in that activity.223 The Court has con-
sistently asserted the importance of the same anonymity values addressed in
the core cases. 224 Most recently, in Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of
New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, the Court reiterated the central tenets of
the anonymous-speech doctrine in the context of an ordinance that required
an individual engaging in door-to-door advocacy to display a permit show-
ing the individual's name. 25 The Court criticized the permit obligation for
forcing the "surrender of [the speaker's] anonymity" and highlighted the
privacy, source-bias, and retaliation concerns that have been recognized in
other anonymous-speech cases. 226 Despite the fact that a door-to-door
speaker would of course reveal her physical appearance to the homeowner
and thus never preserve total anonymity, the Watchtower Court spoke in
strong terms about the right not to share one's name or identity and about
the potential chilling effect of the ordinance on those who may wish to can-
vass anonymously for unpopular causes. 227 Importantly, then, even in
instances in which total anonymity is not guaranteed, the Court has protect-
ed the right to speak without connecting one's name to one's message.
B. Potential Perils of Anonymous Speech
To be sure, this vibrant defense of anonymous communication is not
cost free. As the Court in each of the above cases acknowledged, 2 8 and as
scholars have continued to explore, 229 strong anonymity protection creates
222. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 527 (1960); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958).
223. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 165-67 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 183, 198
(1999) (striking down a Colorado requirement that ballot-initiative-petition circulators wear an
identification badge bearing the circulator's name, noting the judiciary's obligation "to guard
against undue hindrances to political conversations and the exchange of ideas," and pointing to
the "reluctance of potential circulators to face ... recrimination and retaliation").
224. Bates, 361 U.S. at 524 (holding that a statute mandating public disclosure of
NAACP membership list would be upheld "only upon showing a subordinating interest which
is compelling"); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 463 (noting that only a compelling interest would be
"sufficient to justify the deterrent effect" that the forced disclosure of NAACP membership
would produce).
225. 536 U.S. at 154 & n.,155 & nn.2-3.
226. Id. at 166-67.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 164-65 (noting that the Village of Stratton could legitimately attempt to pre-
vent fraud and crime); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (noting
the risk that anonymous speech will be abused to "shield[] fraudulent conduct"); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (acknowledging interests in combatting fraud and libel but
noting that the ordinance at issue was not limited to that speech).
229. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Be-
tween Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 78 (1991); Lidsky
1255May 20131
Michigan Law Review
the risk that a speaker will shield her identity for less-than-noble purposes230
or that the absence of attribution will lead to audience confusion,23 ' "serve
as a cloak for the progenitor of irresponsible ideas,' 232 or enable outright
lies.
233
Obviously, removing an attribution of the source removes a sometimes-
useful tool for evaluating the message.234 Listeners and readers "rely on author
identity to reduce the search costs involved in sorting and interpreting the con-
stant barrage of messages they receive,' 235 and requiring identification of a
source might well "advance the search for truth by permitting a more critical
evaluation of facts, figures, and arguments presented. ' 236 Without this attrib-
ution, audiences are left with the communicative equivalent of a generic
product, unable to use brand name as a proxy for qualitative judgments.
237
Indeed, speakers with poor reputations may have every incentive to hide
& Cotter, supra note 209, at 1574-75; Noah Levine, Note, Establishing Legal Accountability
for Anonymous Communication in Cyberspace, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1536-37 (1996);
Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE
L.J. 1084, 1109-12 (1961) [hereinafter Disclosure and the Devil].
230. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191, 2193 (1996)
("Anonymity may encourage honest communication, but ... it may also stimulate dishonest,
corrupt, or simply socially undesirable decisionmaking or communications."); Amy Constan-
tine, Note, What's in a Name? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: An Examination of
the Protection Afforded to Anonymous Political Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459, 469-70 (1996)
("[Dlisclosure ... serves to protect the subject of the speech. Arguably an individual has a
right to be informed about who is criticizing him or speaking against him, truthful or other-
wise."); Sherri L. Eyer, Comment, From Whence It Comes-Is the Message More Revealing
Than the Messenger? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995), 100 DICK.
L. REV. 1051, 1066-67 (1996) ("[I]ndividuals would be less likely to attach their names to
malicious leaflets than to positive materials.").
231. See Kreimer, supra note 229, at 87 ("Abstracting from authorship is a willful sacri-
fice of relevant, and perhaps vital, information.").
232. Disclosure and the Devil, supra note 229, at 1109.
233. See Levmore, supra note 230, at 2193 (noting that anonymity may "stimulate dis-
honest, corrupt, or simply socially undesirable decisionmaking or communications");
Constantine, supra note 230, at 469-70 ("[A] person who is required to put his name to a
document is much less likely to lie than one who can lie anonymously.").
234. Kreimer, supra note 229, at 78 (arguing that identification of those who "partici-
pate[] in public debate ... would provide the facts for accurate decision-making, and also
avoid covert manipulation"); Disclosure and the Devil, supra note 229, at 111 (noting the
argument that "the volume and skill of modem propaganda make identification of the source
of an argument essential to its evaluation").
235. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 209, at 1537.
236. Disclosure and the Devil, supra note 229, at I I 1l; see also Kreimer, supra note
229, at 87 (providing examples where the identity of the speaker might change how one
examines an argument); Levmore, supra note 230, at 2194 ("Generally speaking, the value
of identification ... is greater the more costly it is for the recipient independently to evalu-
ate the accuracy of the communication.").
237. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 209, at 1559; see also Kreimer, supra note 229, at 85
("In one dimension, the identity of a speaker is a proxy for previous communications.").
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their identities. 238 Likewise, anonymity may be the path chosen by those
who wish to spread falsity with impunity, "settle a personal score," "sow
the seeds of discontent, or control public opinion. '239 Anonymity can
"shield speakers from liability for a variety of torts, including defamation,
invasion of privacy, fraud, copyright infringement, and trade secret misap-
propriation. ''240 It can impede important investigations in civil and criminal
matters.
2 41
Thus, although "in general, our society accords greater weight to the value
of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse, 2 42 for some or all of the rea-
sons enumerated above, the Court has in some circumstances found that the
government has in fact demonstrated a sufficiently important governmental
interest in revealing the speaker's name. 243 Indeed, even in cases that most
broadly defined and most stringently applied the anonymous-speech right, the
Court has kept open the possibility that compelling counterinterests may be
shown in other cases.24 The McIntyre Court noted that "the right to remain
anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct."245 It agreed
that "[tihe state interest in preventing fraud and libel stands on a different
footing. '24 6 The Watchtower Court highlighted the possible interests of "pre-
vention of fraud," "prevention of crime," and protection of audience
privacy 247 as interests that, although not demonstrated in that case, might
suffice in another. And it explicitly stated that governmental limitations on
anonymity "may well be justified ... by the special state interest in protect-
ing the integrity of a ballot-initiative process or by the interest in preventing
fraudulent commercial transactions ."248
Most notably, perhaps, in the distinctive setting of required disclosure of
the identities of monetary contributors to political campaigns,2 49 the Court
238. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 209, at 1562 ("[T]he speaker with the reputation for
dishonesty or poor quality work has an obvious motive to keep her identity a secret, because in
doing so she may increase the likelihood that people will believe her statement or overrate her
work product.").
239. Id. at 1574.
240. Id. at 1539; see also Constantine, supra note 230, at 469-70.
241. Levine, supra note 229, at 1536-37.
242. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
243. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam).
244. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 165 (2002); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
245. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
246. Id. at 349. The Court further noted that this interest "carries special weight during
election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences
for the public at large." Id.
247. Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 164-65.
248. Id. at 167 (citation omitted).
249. See Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) ("We have a series of
precedents considering First Amendment challenges to disclosure requirements in the electoral
context."). In this disclosure context, the Court has said that it is applying "exacting scrutiny,"
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repeatedly has upheld restrictions on anonymous speech. In Buckley v.
Valeo, appellants challenged a federal statute requiring disclosure of the
identities of individuals making contributions to political campaigns that
exceeded certain monetary thresholds. 2 ° The Court held that the interests of
preventing "corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the
real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions '25 1 suf-
ficed to trump anonymous-speech rights,25 2 and it determined that the
campaign disclosure requirements directly served those interests and "ap-
pear[ed] to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign
ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist. '253 Likewise, in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court addressed a challenge
to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA"). 254 Relying on Buckley,
the Court upheld the requirement that purchasers of television advertise-
ments advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office
disclose their identities, given the very strong interests in "providing the
electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any
appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more sub-
stantive electioneering restrictions. '255 Though Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission overruled many aspects of McConnell, it is significant
that it did not invalidate the disclosure requirements of BCRA.
2 5 6
Although scholars have criticized this isolated line of cases as incon-
sistent with the larger anonymous-speech doctrine 257-and the debate
continues as to whether constitutional values are in fact best served by forc-
ing disclosure of contributors' identities 25 -it is notable that the Court in
each of these cases continued to explicitly recognize the strong right of
id., a term that has proven somewhat opaque but that increasingly appears to be not as
demanding as strict scrutiny. The standard "requires a 'substantial relation' between the
disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmental interest." Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
64, 66 (1976) (per curiam)). Still, the Court has emphasized that to withstand this scrutiny,
"the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on
First Amendment rights." Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008) (citation
omitted).
250. 424 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1976) (per curiam).
251. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
252. Id. at 66-68.
253. Id. at 68.
254. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
255. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196.
256. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914-16 (2010).
257. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 209, at 1555 ("Even if McConnell and McIntyre are
distinguishable, they have a deep theoretical inconsistency.").
258. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 229, at 6-8.
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anonymous speech 259 and subjected limitations on such speech to height-
ened, "exacting scrutiny."
260
All told, given the great value of anonymous speech not only to the free
flow of public information but also to the individual-liberty interests served by
the First Amendment, and given the content-based nature of any governmental
effort to impede this anonymity, the Court has consistently recognized the
right to speak anonymously as a fundamental constitutional right. In some
settings, the government will be able to overcome the high constitutional
barrier to unmasking such a speaker, but the Court has nevertheless recog-
nized a foundational First Amendment protection for the citizen who
chooses to "speak her mind, but sometimes not her name."26 '
III. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE TO CONFIDENTIAL NEWS SOURCES
Utilizing the anonymous-speech framework as the analytical structure
for assessing the rights implicated in a confidential-source situation is both
theoretically more coherent and practically more workable than the current
post-Branzburg framework. Making this shift in lenses-from a focus on the
reporter and her newsgathering right to a focus on the source and her right to
speak anonymously-would be entirely consistent with the major premises
and objectives of the Court's anonymous-speech cases and would lack the
drawbacks of the attractive-in-theory-but-difficult-in-practice post-Branzburg
approach. This Part describes each of these benefits of the proposed shift. It
discusses how the public-information values, including the newsgathering
function, could continue to be defended under this approach, but it also high-
lights how housing the inquiry in the anonymous-speech rubric better
positions the Court to consider additional individual-liberty values recog-
nized by and enforced through the Speech Clause. Finally, it demonstrates
the workability of the approach by discussing a similar application of the
framework by courts in recent decisions dealing with the limited but closely
analogous setting of anonymous online comments.
A. Utilizing the Anonymous-Speech Doctrine in
a Confidential-Source Situation
A confidential source who does not wish to have her name revealed is
analytically indistinguishable from any other author, writer, or speaker who
wishes to convey information anonymously. Like the leafleteer in Talley
who wanted the consuming public to know that merchants were selling
259. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam) ("[W]e have repeat-
edly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association
and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.").
260. E.g., id. at 44-45, 75 (explaining that the Court was required to apply a "strict
standard of scrutiny" in reviewing the disclosure requirements); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
914 (subjecting disclaimer and disclosure requirements to "exacting scrutiny").
261. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 337, 358 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring).
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goods produced through discriminatory labor practices2 62 but did not want
that public to know that he was the source of the message, or like the con-
cerned taxpayer in McIntyre who wanted to present arguments against the
tax referendum but did not want those statements linked to her by name,263 a
confidential source offers information that she wishes to make public with-
out attribution to her own identity for any number of reasons that the Court
has acknowledged as valid.264 As such, the source should be entitled to pro-
tection under the anonymous-speech doctrine for statements made to a
reporter in confidence.
265
As a purely technical matter, of course, the anonymous source has not
kept herself totally unidentified. She has, in most instances, made herself
known to the reporter for whom she has agreed to act as a confidential
source.266 But because this communication occurs in a context in which con-
fidentiality is demanded, guaranteed, and fully expected, it is in no sense an
actual, public identification. 267 Indeed, the dynamic that takes place when a
confidential source approaches a reporter with information that she wishes
262. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 61 (1960).
263. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337.
264. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972) (acknowledging "job security, per-
sonal safety, or peace of mind"); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("[A] defamed plaintiff might relish an opportunity to retaliate against the inform-
ant."); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 1972) (acknowledging the risk of
"retaliation or reprisals and physical danger"); National Media Brief, supra note 51, at 19,
1971 WL 133333, at * 19 (acknowledging desire not to place job in jeopardy).
265. These situations are not precisely identical, of course, because the reporter's source,
unlike the speaker of the leaflet message, speaks through an intermediary who sometimes
takes a more active role in translating the message, determining which portions of the infor-
mation to include, and placing it within a larger context in a news story. Indeed, the reporter
may do so in a way that is dissatisfying to the initial speaker. In truth, however, virtually all
communication is mediated in some way. Leafleteers convey their message by way of a print-
er. Individuals who communicate online do so through an internet service provider ("ISP"). In
choosing the mechanism by which her speech will be mediated, every speaker conducts a
risk-benefit calculation. The source has presumably accepted whatever additional conse-
quences come with mediating her communication through a reporter in exchange for the
perceived benefits, which might include garnering a wider audience, gathering greater support
for the message, and increasing the legitimacy that might attend a message delivered through
this vehicle. The important common element for First Amendment analysis is that the source
who speaks on condition of confidentiality has made a conscious choice in favor of anonymi-
ty. The Court has recognized the value of anonymous speech-to the substance of public
debate and to the liberty interests of the speaker-without regard to the vehicle chosen to
convey the message to listeners.
266. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668, 673 (Branzburg "refused to identify the individuals he
had seen," and Pappas "refused to answer any questions about what had taken place" in order
to "protect confidential informants."). Truly anonymous-source situations do exist, such as a
letter left in a newspaper's mailbox or an untraceable phone call with a tip. However, it is rare
for these types of sources to be cited in print because of reader skepticism of "the accuracy of
reports involving confidential sources and ... the motives of those who decline to go on rec-
ord." Jones, Empirical Study, supra note 8, at 651.
267. Importantly, as noted above, the Court has recognized that even partial revelation of
one's identity does not preclude a right to anonymity as to that which has not been revealed.
See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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to share anonymously is best viewed as the same as any other anonymous
speaker's selection of the mode of communication that she will use to dis-
tribute her message without attribution. The reporter and the newspaper are
merely the vehicles by which the anonymous message will be distributed-
the functional equivalents of the unsigned leaflet or handbill. Recognizing
that the anonymous-speech rights of this speaker are equivalent to the rights
of anonymous speakers in those other contexts comports with the Court's
view of the press as an agent of public information 268 and with the basic
First Amendment principle that a speaker is free to choose not only the con-
tent of her message but also the manner by which she shares it. 269 Indeed, if
the flow of information to the public is a major value underlying the anon-
ymous-speech right, as the Court has repeatedly suggested is the case, 270 the
anonymous speaker who selects a reporter and the associated media outlet
as the vehicles for her anonymous speech may even more closely align with
these doctrinal moorings than the handbill and leaflet distributors, whose
cases created the doctrinal foundation. Although the Court has wisely avoid-
ed making a speaker's level of protection contingent on a showing of any
specified degree of actual public-information value, it is nevertheless telling
that one's audience is likely to be significantly enhanced when the chosen
vehicle is a reporter rather than an anonymous handbill or leaflet.
Using the anonymous-speech rubric to decide questions arising out of the
confidential-source situation would reduce or eliminate many of the most
troublesome complexities that currently vex the post-Branzburg, reporter-
based rubric. An investigation of the anonymous-speech rights of a
confidential source would pose no definitional problems because the
approach, unlike that of Branzburg, does not rise and fall on the nature of the
speaker, the nature of the audience, or the value of the information
communicated. The Court has drawn none of these distinctions in its
anonymous-speech cases, instead posing as the threshold questions only
whether there was a speaker who wished to convey a message without
268. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980)
(plurality opinion); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) ("The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public
interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and
generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences. ), quoted in
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
269. Regulations limiting the manner of speech are constitutional only if they are "justi-
fied without reference to the content of the regulated speech," are "narrowly tailored to serve a
substantial governmental interest," and "leave open ample alternative channels" of communi-
cation. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Underlying this
doctrine is a starting presumption in favor of speaker choice in the manner of communication.
Only if there exists some governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression
may the government take steps to limit the choice of communicative mechanism. Id. And
never has the Court suggested that the mere existence of alternative avenues, standing alone,
suffices to justify a limitation on a speaker's choice of a particular manner of communication.
270. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
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attribution and whether governmental interference hindered this
constitutionally protected form of communication.
271
Nor would an anonymous-speech approach mire the inquiry in impossi-
ble investigations of necessity and degree as the post-Branzburg approach
does. To be sure, both approaches are animated at least in part by the same
sets of concerns-the risk of retaliation against the speaker, the desire to
avoid source bias, the need to protect speaker privacy2 2-and by the under-
standing that, in a system in which the government compels speaker
attribution, people who have these concerns will self-censor speech that oth-
erwise would freely flow. 273 The important difference is that Branzburg,
which focuses exclusively on the newsgathering right of the reporter and the
public-information values to be served by that process, turns on the exist-
ence of this chilling effect and the concomitant interruption to the flow of
news.274 Conversely, under the anonymous-speech doctrine, the Court has
indicated that the elimination of these barriers to communication and infor-
mation flow is an aspiration to be served by protecting anonymous speech but
has not described it as the guiding justification for the protection. Avoiding the
deterrence of communication and the chilling of speech is an important First
Amendment aim, but the Court has not suggested, outside the unique cam-
paign finance context, that only speech that would genuinely be deterred in
the absence of anonymity protection is deserving of this protection.275 The
individual liberty to choose one's own message 27 6 and to be free from a gov-
ernment dictate as to the content of one's communication, including the
271. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165-68 (2002); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
272. See Richard M. Cardillo, Note, I Am Publius, and I Approve This Message: The
Baffling and Conflicted State of Anonymous Pamphleteering Post-McConnell, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1929, 1949 (2005) (explaining the considerations motivating the protection of
anonymous speech); infra note 284 (giving examples of these concerns being articulated under
the post-Branzburg approach).
273. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725-26
(1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
274. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The right to gather news
implies, in turn, a right to a confidential relationship between a reporter and his source. This
proposition follows as a matter of simple logic once three factual predicates are recognized:
(1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2) confidentiality-the promise or under-
standing that names or certain aspects of communications will be kept off the record-is
essential to the creation and maintenance of a news-gathering relationship with informants;
and (3) an unbridled subpoena power-the absence of a constitutional right protecting, in any
way, a confidential relationship from compulsory process-will either deter sources from
divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing information.").
275. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam) (requiring those who wish
for an exemption from disclosure requirements to show "a reasonable probability that the
compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment,
or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties").
276. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573
(1995) ("[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker
has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.").
1262 [Vol. I111: 1221
Rethinking Reporter's Privilege
attribution of one's authorship, 277 is a foundational First Amendment princi-
ple that requires no demonstration of ill effect or empirical showing of the
creation of detrimental incentives. At least in cases of direct bans on ano-
nymity, the Court has found a deprivation of the anonymous-speech right to
be the functional equivalent of content control278 that receives strict scrutiny,
and thus, unless the government can demonstrate that such a limitation is the
least restrictive means of meeting a compelling governmental interest,27 9 it
will fail constitutional review.
280
Finally, and importantly, unlike the moving doctrinal target of the post-
Branzburg reporter's privilege-which has been embraced to varying degrees
and with varying consistencies in different circuits and different contexts, and
which remains open to serious question and criticism about its proper scope
and application 28 1-a focus on an underlying fundamental right would place
the analysis of a reporter-confidential source situation within a longstand-
ing, established framework of constitutional jurisprudence. Although, as is
always the case in constitutional decisionmaking, stability of application in
this new context would necessarily be developed over time, as precedent
277. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 ("[A]n author's decision to remain anonymous, like
other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect
of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment."); see also Police Dep't of Chi-
cago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("The essence of this forbidden censorship is content
control.").
278. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42.
279. Id. at 347.
280. It should be noted that although all the case law from the Supreme Court on the ques-
tion of anonymous-speech rights (excluding those decisions in the unique area of campaign
speech) and all the lower court case law applying that anonymous-speech doctrine to the subpoe-
na context, see infra Section Ill.D, appear to be applying strict scrutiny, it is possible that the way
in which the relevant subpoena law is statutorily structured might have an impact on the standard
employed by courts when they are faced with an infringement of the anonymous-speech right.
The Supreme Court cases in the area of anonymous-speech rights have all involved direct in-
fringement of the right through statutory bans on speaking anonymously. See, e.g., McIntyre, 514
U.S. at 334 (striking down a direct ban on anonymous literature); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60 (1960) (striking down a direct ban on anonymous leafleting). It is possible that a generally
applicable subpoena statute might be viewed as an incidental rather than direct infringement on
anonymous speech, and thus there is a case to be made that intermediate rather than strict scruti-
ny would apply. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that
intermediate scrutiny applies when neutral laws create "incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms"). None of the subpoena cases discussed in Section I.D distinguish
the infringement of the right in these ways and all appear to be adopting the broader strict
scrutiny framework. See infra note 370. This is perhaps because the analogy of forced speaker
identification to content control is only one of the many theoretical moorings for the status of
anonymous speech as a fundamental right, or perhaps because a statute authorizing a subpoe-
na ad testificandum is viewed as a direct rather than incidental regulation of speech. In
either event, a fundamental right to speak anonymously is unquestionably at stake when a
subpoena is issued for the name of a confidential source; the existence of this right should
constitute the starting point for the analysis of the propriety of unmasking the source, under
already-established constitutional doctrines with contours that are significantly clearer than
the ambiguous post-Branzburg approach.
281. See supra Part 1.
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was built and the interests that might suffice as compelling were investigated
and enunciated, the framework itself would provide a core stability for this
doctrinal growth that the post-Branzburg case law fundamentally lacks. This
stability would provide guidance to courts that have been doctrinally adrift
on the reporter's privilege question. Equally importantly, it would provide
fairness and practical utility to those who are subjected to the law and are
ordering their communicative decisions around it.
25 z
B. A More Appropriate Recognition of the Values Served by
Confidential-Source Protection
Beyond being less complicated to understand and apply, the anonymous-
speech doctrine is a substantively better avenue for considering anonymity
promises between a reporter and confidential source because it requires
acknowledgement of the fuller scope of First Amendment values implicated
by the reporter-confidential source dynamic. The newsgathering-only focus
that emerged from Branzburg, although rightly aiming to enhance the flow of
information to the public, is nevertheless myopic, in that it acknowledges only
those public-information values and fails to recognize all of the relevant
communicative players in that dynamic. The public and its information-flow
needs are of course important. The reporter undoubtedly matters a great deal
as the key communicator of that information to the public. But failing to doc-
trinally acknowledge the initial communicator in the dynamic-without
whom none of the other First Amendment actors would have information to
convey or receive-is an analytical lapse that should be remedied.
This remedy is readily available in the already existing First Amendment
anonymous-speech doctrine, which would explicitly serve the dual individual-
liberty and public-information values that are implicated when information is
shared without author attribution. First, this approach would acknowledge
the First Amendment's individual-liberty objectives and squarely serve indi-
vidual free-speech values that the post-Branzburg approach identifies
obliquely, at best.283 It would require that the inquiry face head-on the values
of speaker privacy, antiretaliation, and source bias that are only circuitously
acknowledged in the Branzburg line of cases. 2 4 This approach would also
282. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (explaining that statutes in-
hibiting First Amendment freedoms that do not provide "ascertainable standards of conduct"
impede individuals' ability to lawfully order their activities); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
432-33 (1963) (citing vagueness and overbreadth as impeding fairness in the application of
the law and limiting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms).
283. Compare McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357 (describing how anonymous-speech protection
serves the "purpose ... of the First Amendment ... to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society"), with
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972) (arguing that even if some "informants not
themselves implicated in crime will nevertheless, for whatever reason, refuse to talk to news-
men if they fear identification," this interest is weaker than the interest in prosecuting crime).
284. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695 (acknowledging that exposure of an informant may
threaten the informant's "job security, personal safety, or peace of mind"); Bruno & Stillman,
Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[T]here may be cases where
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require recognition of the more fundamental First Amendment individual-
liberty values of speaker autonomy and self-fulfillment,285 which simply do
not manifest themselves in the Branzburg line, despite a communication that
always begins with an individual speaker.
Significantly, this shift of paradigm, although expanding the recognition
of values to include individual First Amendment liberties, would not represent
a shift away from recognition of the First Amendment's public-information
goals. Rather, it would provide a far superior doctrinal investigation of the
concerns that are regularly expressed in reporter's privilege cases about incen-
tivizing communications from source to reporter and then from reporter to the
public.286 As the anonymous-speech cases have made clear,2 8 7 application
of this line of precedent would continue to acknowledge the First Amend-
ment's purposes of encouraging community- serving information,
increasing the contributions willingly made to the marketplace of ideas,288
and enhancing self-governance with a deeper, richer discourse on matters
of public import.289 These value arguments have been made for decades in
support of assorted variations of the post-Branzburg privilege for report-
ers,290 but giving them an analytical home in an already-established
anonymous-speech rubric makes it clear that the values will receive their
due attention and that the applicable doctrinal test has a legitimate place
within the First Amendment edifice.
revelation of sources will threaten physical or other harm .... "); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464
F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 1972) (finding a reporter protected under newsgathering right but not-
ing that reporter argued that divulging names would "subject his informants to retaliation or
reprisals and physical danger").
285. See supra note 213.
286. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 720 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Forcing a reporter before
a grand jury will have two retarding effects upon the ear and the pen of the press. Fear of ex-
posure will cause dissidents to communicate less openly to trusted reporters. And, fear of
accountability will cause editors and critics to write with more restrained pens.").
287. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
288. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 ("[T]he interest in having anonymous works enter
the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure
as a condition of entry.").
289. See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Without an unfet-
tered press, citizens would be far less able to make informed political, social, and economic
choices."); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596 (1st Cir. 1980)
(noting the "potential harm to the free flow of information"); Riley v. City of Chester, 612
F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979) ("A journalist's inability to protect the confidentiality of sources
.... will seriously erode the essential role played by the press in the dissemination of infor-
mation."); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) (noting that
there is "an underlying public interest" in "publications which communicate to the public
information and opinion"); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992 n.9 (8th Cir. 1972)
("[T]he free flow of news obtainable only from anonymous sources is likely to be deterred
absent complete confidentiality.").
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C. The Assertion of the Right by Either the Source or the Reporter
In shifting the focus to the anonymous-speech right, the approach pro-
posed here should make clear that the source, as a protected speaker, may
press her own rights in court. This may be increasingly important in the
changing world of American journalism, as reporters and media outlets that
once had the financial ability and industry cohesion to litigate confidential-
source issues become less able or less willing to do so.2 9 1 While the
Branzburg-era media were exceptionally profitable and operated with aggres-
sive litigation teams willing to vigorously defend constitutional principles that
impacted the operation of the press, 292 today's newspapers are struggling to
stay afloat, and the online entities that are replacing them may not possess the
resources or inclination to press those rights.293 For these reasons, a move to a
constitutional rubric that explicitly embraces the individual rights of the
source could have a positive effect on the enforcement of the newsgathering
public-information values.
Significantly, however, those individual litigants would not be the only
potential enforcers of the anonymity right. Reporters and media companies
that are financially able should continue to press the rights themselves.
Rather than litigating these interests through the post-Branzburg framework,
reporters and the news organizations that employ them may be found to
have third-party standing to assert the anonymous-speech rights of their
sources. Although the Court has prudentially sought to limit the instances in
which litigants are given standing to "vindicate the constitutional rights of
some third party,"29 4 the rule disfavoring this kind of standing has "never
been absolute." '295 In recent years, the Court has regularly exercised its
discretion to allow third-party standing "whenever a practical impediment
makes it difficult for a right-holder to assert her own rights and some
relation exists between the right-holder and the party asserting third-party
standing. 2 96 Both of those conditions are certainly satisfied in the
reporter-confidential source dynamic. Accordingly, the adoption of the
291. See Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy, supra note 30, at 617.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 410 (1991) ("In the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and
interests ...."); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263
(1977) ("In the ordinary case a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons.");
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Federal courts must hesitate
before resolving a controversy, even one within their constitutional power to resolve, on the
basis of the fights of third persons not parties to the litigation.").
295. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-
Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1321, 1359 (2000) (citation omitted).
296. Id. at 1359-60. Some justices have argued that the expanded scope that the Court
has given to third-party standing in recent years is doctrinally unwise, but they are in the mi-
nority. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 135-36 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[Ilit is ... doubtful ... whether third-party standing should sweep as broadly as our cases
have held that it does.").
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anonymous-speech framework for deciding confidential-source cases should
be accompanied by judicial recognition of third-party standing for reporters
who face subpoenas to reveal a source's identity.
297
1. Closeness of Relationship
Because the limitations on third-party standing "developed as a matter
of judicial self-restraint," the courts remain wholly free to "consider whether
judicial review of a particular case would be prudent." 298 Where the "rela-
tionship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert" is such
that the "enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the activity
the litigant wishes to pursue, 2 99 a court can be confident that the construc-
tion of the right "is not unnecessary" and that the litigant will be "fully, or
very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right" as the actual holder of it.
300
The relationship between reporter and confidential source is just such a rela-
tionship. The news-dissemination interests of the reporter are often tied nearly
perfectly to those of the source,3°0 and the two parties thus have a symbiotic
relationship grounded in constitutionally protected activity. Indeed, in grant-
ing common-law and statutory privileges to reporters in the last generation,
courts 3 2 and legislatures 303 have repeatedly cited the closeness, the value, and
297. Although increasingly generous, the third-party standing doctrine remains a signifi-
cant enough prudential limitation that it will bar assertions of the right by individuals with
minor or insubstantial relationships with the would-be anonymous speaker or by those with no
underlying interests of their own. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-11. This Article's proposed
approach, which does not require that the individual who promised confidentiality to the
speaker be a reporter, could be expected to be invoked in other contexts and might be criti-
cized for creating the potential for larger numbers of subpoenaed individuals to refuse to
provide information on the grounds that the information was conveyed to them by a speaker
who requested anonymity. The third-party standing rules might be expected to act as a mean-
ingful brake on what might otherwise be a more sweeping scope of the approach, thus
producing both doctrinal consistency and practical workability.
298. John C. Yang, Standing ... in the Doorway of Justice, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1356, 1361 (1991) (citation omitted).
299. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114 (plurality opinion).
300. Id. at 115.
301. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 720-22 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(noting that constraints on sources also constrain reporters).
302. Some states that developed a common-law reporter's privilege have based their
analysis on Wigmore's test for determining whether an evidentiary privilege ought to be adopted,
which mandates that "the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered" and the "[t]he injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of
litigation." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2285 (emphasis omitted). See, e.g., State v. Kiss (In re
Contempt of Wright), 700 P.2d 40,48 (Idaho 1985); Senear v. Daily Journal-Am., 641 P.2d 1180,
1183 (Wash. 1982) (en banc). Other courts have emphasized the importance of the reporter-
informant relationship in their case law employing similar principles. See, e.g., Atlanta
Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 180 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Sands v. News Am.
Publ'g Inc., 560 N.YS.2d 416, 423-24 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Geis, 441 N.E.2d 803, 808
(Ohio Ct. App. 1981); State v. Ventura, 101 Ohio Misc. 2d 15, 19 (Ct. Com. P1. 1999).
303. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.022 (West 2010) ("The purpose of [the state
shield law] is to insure [sic] and perpetuate, consistent with the public interest, the confidential
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the constitutional interconnectedness of the relationship between the report-
er and the confidential source as justifications for recognizing these
nonconstitutional versions of the privilege.3" Many courts30 5 and legisla-
tures306 have emphasized that the relationship is worthy of safeguarding by
relationship between the news media and its sources."); WASH. H.R. OFFICE OF PROGRAM
RESEARCH, BILL ANALYSIS: HB 1366, H.R. 60 (2007), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/
documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/1 366.HBA%2007.pdf; WASH. S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENATE BILL REPORT: HB 1366, S. 60 (2007), available at
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2007-08/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/I 366.SBR.pdf
(calling the relationship between reporters and sources one of the "classes of relationships or
communications within those relationships [that] are deemed of such importance that they
should be protected").
304. See, e.g., In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d at 48 (recognizing that the relationship
between reporters and sources should be protected because the work that it produces is of
"utmost importance"); Sprague v. Walter, 543 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Pa. 1988) ("Because our soci-
ety is also one that encourages an open interchange of ideas between its members and seeks to
maintain the free flow of such ideas to the media, there is [a] ... strong societal purpose in
fostering uninhibited disclosure between individuals and the media."); In re Taylor, 193 A.2d
181, 185 (Pa. 1963) (calling statute granting a reporter's privilege "a wise and salutary decla-
ration of public policy whose spiritual father is the revered Constitutionally ordained freedom
of the press"); Senear, 641 P.2d at 1183 (noting that the relationship is valuable "[g]iven both
the complex and diffuse nature of modern society, the need for citizens in a representative
democracy to make considered judgments, and the increasing importance of journalists to
convey information to citizens").
305. See, e.g., Cont'l Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broad. Co., 583 F. Supp. 427, 433 (E.D.
Mo. 1984) ("The rationale [for the reporter's privilege] is akin to other privileges, such as the
attorney-client privilege or the privilege of the government in a criminal case to withhold the
identity of its informants."); Anderson v. Nixon, 444 E Supp. 1195, 1200 (D.D.C. 1978)
(comparing the reporter's privilege with the attorney-client and informant privileges);
Wheeler v. Goulart, 593 A.2d 173, 181-82 (D.C. 1991) (per curiam) (agreeing with "cases
which have noted the similarity between a reporter's privilege and the attorney-client and
informant privilege," and explaining that "[b]oth the attorney-client and the informant privi-
lege are inextricably tied to the free flow of information"); Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 691 A.2d
321, 331-32 (N.J. 1997) (describing "certain confidential communications [that are deemed to
be] qualitatively different and thus deserving of an evidentiary privilege" and listing as exam-
ples the "newsperson's privilege" along with the physician-patient, clergy-penitent, and
attorney-client privileges); In re Knight-Ridder Broad., Inc. v. Greenberg, 511 N.E.2d 1116,
1118 (N.Y. 1987) (explaining that "the entire thrust of the Shield Law was aimed at encourag-
ing a free press by shielding those communications given to the news media in confidence"
and in this regard was similar to other privileges which are generally based on confidential
relationships (citation omitted)); Sprague, 543 A.2d at 1082 (noting that the reporter's privi-
lege is akin to others involving "parties sharing a unique relationship" and citing the attorney-
client, spousal, physician-patient, and priest-penitent privileges as examples); In re Taylor,
193 A.2d at 185 (noting that the value placed on protecting sources is the same "public policy"
value long placed on various other relationships, including those with attorneys and clergy).
306. Many states have placed their shield laws either next to or in a list with other types
of evidentiary privileges, such as the spousal, medical, and clerical privileges, signaling that
the reporter's privilege similarly arises from a significantly protected relationship. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West 2009); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-146t (2009); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (2013); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-901 (2011); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-46-4-1, 34-46-4-2 (West 2011); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 9-112 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-
902 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2011);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (LexisNexis 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2011); OKLA.
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comparing it to other close relationships that warrant protection under tes-
timonial privileges, such as attorney and client, clergy and penitent, and
husband and wife. These aspects of the reporter-source relationship render
it at least as close a relationship as, and arguably closer than, many relation-
ships that the Court has found suffice for third-party standing.3 °7
2. Practical Impediment
The courts have also suggested that a grant of third-party standing may
require some showing that the ability of the third party to assert her own
right is in some way compromised by a practical impediment.308 Given the
source-bias, retaliation, and privacy concerns that the Court has recognized
as inherent in identifying an anonymous speaker, a reporter asserting the
rights of her source should have little difficulty demonstrating a "genuine
obstacle"3 9 to the source's own assertion of those rights or a "social stigma-
tization" in forcing this assertion.310 The source's absence from court would
not have a "tendency to suggest that his right is not truly at stake or truly
important to him";311 rather, it is explainable by the very reasons the ano-
nymity is being sought.
STAT. fit. 12, § 2506 (2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-11-100 (Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000); UTAH R. EVID. 509. Oth-
er states have explicitly compared the reporter-source relationship to these other important
confidential relationships in their legislative histories. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.5015
(analogizing to attorney-client, husband-wife, trade secrets, and psychotherapist-patient
privileges); Transcript of Apr. 12, 2006, Sess. of Conn. H.R., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://
search.cga.state.ct.us/adv/ (click "Session Transcripts" box; then enter "04/12/2006" in "Title"
field; then click "Search") (last retrieved Jan. 3, 2013) (analogizing to privileges between
counselor and patient or husband and wife); Transcript of Mar. 10, 2006, Hearing of Conn.
H.R. Judiciary Comm., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://search.cga.state.ct.us/adv/ (click "Pub-
lic Hearing Transcripts" box; then enter "03/10/2006" in "Title" field; then click "Search")
(last retrieved Jan. 3, 2013) (analogizing to attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privi-
leges).
307. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (finding third-party standing for
criminal defendants on behalf of excluded jurors); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678, 683-84 (1977) (holding that a corporation selling contraceptives via mail-order has third-
party standing on behalf of potential customers); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 (1977) (finding that a housing-development corporation
challenging zoning decisions allegedly motivated by racial discrimination has third-party
standing, despite not being directly impacted by the alleged discrimination); Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that an abortion doctor has
third-party standing on behalf of patients); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194-97 (1976)
(holding that a beer vendor has third-party standing to sue on behalf of patrons against whom
a law allegedly discriminates); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (finding
third-party standing for a physician and Planned Parenthood executive on behalf of married
clients seeking contraceptives).
308. E.g., Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115-16 (plurality opinion).
309. Id.
310. Yang, supra note 298, at 1361-63 (citations omitted).
311. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 116.
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Although courts can and do engage in John and Jane Doe lawsuits that
endeavor to preserve the anonymity of a litigant, the reporter in many in-
stances may be "the [anonymous-speech] right's best available
proponent."'3 12 The reporter herself is a key player with a news-
dissemination goal and is thus impacted even more directly than many of
the parties that the Court has recognized as acceptable surrogates in its
third-party standing cases.313 Moreover, the confidential-source issue will
most often arise in the course of a subpoena issued to a reporter, and pro-
tection of the reporter will be a necessary step in protecting the
anonymous speaker, as the reporter almost always knows the speaker's
identity. If the constitutional norm "is to be implemented effectively, the
Court may need to permit challenges by those well-situated to lodge
them."'3 14 Indeed, courts have repeatedly acknowledged this principle by
allowing third-party standing in closely comparable cases involving an
arguable chilling effect on or anonymous-speech right of an initial speak-
er, coupled with a shared First Amendment interest by the party seeking
standing.3"5 The Court has declared itself "free to draw upon a wisdom
peculiarly judicial in character-to elaborate upon the meaning of consti-
tutionally cognizable injury, and then to weigh considerations of policy 3 16
in deciding whether a given litigant should be able to assert a right belong-
ing to another. The nature of the constitutional injuries at stake in a
reporter-source dynamic and the weighty policy concerns that the poten-
tial revelation of a source implicates should lead a court to allow a reporter
to assert the anonymous-speech right of her source. Permitting the reporter
to do so in response to a subpoena seeking the source's name will abso-
lutely "further the values inherent in [the source's anonymous speech]
right" 7 and will thus be in keeping with the Court's clear trends in apply-
ing its own prudential limitations.
D. Anonymous Speech Online: A Useful Analogy
Recent developments in the analogous setting of attempts to unmask
anonymous speakers online offer a potentially helpful illustration of both
312. Id.
313. See Note, Overbreadth and Listeners'Rights, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1749, 1749 (2010)
("The Supreme Court has permitted third parties to assert the legal rights of others who are
their customers, clients, patients, jurors, and even voters." (footnotes omitted)).
314. Fallon, supra note 295, at 1364; see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 246 (1988) (arguing that third-party standing cases should be seen
simply as a "determination of whether plaintiffs have the legal right to enforce the duty in
question," with the "touchstone [being] the nature of the underlying right, and ... whether a
grant of standing will further the values inherent in that right").
315. See Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth: Pro-
tections for Anonymous Online Speech, J. INTERNET L., Mar. 2010, at 1, 17 n.23 (listing
examples of cases in which third parties were allowed standing).
316. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464,492 n.4 (1982).
317. Fletcher, supra note 314, at 246.
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how the third-party standing analysis proposed here might be undertaken
by courts and how the substantive anonymous-speech doctrine might ef-
fectively operate in the reporter-source context.
The ease with which one can speak anonymously online has created a
body of anonymous-speech litigation in which prosecutors, would-be
plaintiffs, and other litigants have sought to force the communicative enti-
ties that have information regarding a speaker's true identity to reveal that
identity, notwithstanding the speaker's desire to remain anonymous.
318
Often, these cases arise out of anonymous comments posted on a website
dedicated to the distribution of public-affairs reporting or other infor-
mation sharing. 319 In at least some cases, the websites are the online
editions of newspapers, and the anonymous postings are subscribers' or
other readers' comments on a news story produced by a reporter.320 An
individual who wishes to remain anonymous contributes a statement, and
then other parties take legal steps to unmask the online speaker because
they are interested in the information that she has shared-perhaps be-
cause that statement is arguably defamatory,32 1 gives rise to another civil
cause of action3 22 or is potentially useful to a criminal investigation.
Ordinarily, the plaintiff desiring to reveal the speaker's identity has
sued a Jane or John Doe defendant 323 and then "move[d] for issuance of a
pre-service discovery subpoena on the owner of the Web site on which the
318. For an excellent overview of the legal treatment of anonymous online speech, see
Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 315.
319. See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Online News: User Agreements and Implications for
Readers, 79 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 602, 602 (2002) (reporting that "[o]f the nation's
1,483 daily newspapers [in 2002], more than 1,200 ha[d] Internet news sites," and that the
majority had user agreements allowing "participat[ion] in interactive news forums"); Jane E.
Kirtley, Mask, Shield, and Sword: Should the Journalist's Privilege Protect the Identity of
Anonymous Posters to News Media Websites?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1478, 1488-89 (2010) ("As
news organizations have experimented with ways to encourage their readers to interact with
their online news products, one of the most popular options has been to allow readers to post
comments adjacent to a news story.").
320. See, e.g., Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF, 2009 WL 4802567, at *2
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009); Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 751 E Supp. 2d 782, 783 (M.D. Pa.
2008); Maxon v. Ottawa Publ'g Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 669 (I11. App. Ct. 2010).
321. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John
Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1374-76 (2009) (discussing libel suits involving anonymous
online posters and how those posters' identities can be uncovered).
322. See, e.g., NLRB v. Midland Daily News, 151 F.3d 472, 473 (6th Cir. 1998) (adjudi-
cating the National Labor Relations Board's suit to identify the source of an anonymous
advertisement); Salehoo Grp., Ltd. v. ABC Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (W.D. Wash.
2010) (alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement); USA Techs., Inc. v. Doe, 713 F. Supp. 2d
901, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (alleging that the anonymous poster violated the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934).
323. Individuals who claim injuries arising from the anonymous communications on a
website are most likely to bring their cause of action against the anonymous poster and not the
website owner because section 230 of the Federal Communications Decency Act gives web-
site owners immunity from most liability for the content of third-party posts. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1) (2012).
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offending material was posted, the anonymous poster's [i]ntemet service
provider (ISP), or both. 3 24 These cases thus parallel the reporter's privilege
context in an important way: a collector and distributor of information is
subpoenaed for the identity of an anonymous speaker whose message was
made public through that communicative entity.3 25 Many of the reported
cases involve would-be plaintiffs seeking anonymous-online-poster identi-
ties for purposes of naming the poster as a civil defendant;3 26 some cases,
however, involve parties that used subpoenas to seek the identity of an
anonymous poster who is not a party and whose speech "is not alleged to
have caused any harm," but who is instead seen, like the reporters in
Branzburg, as a valuable potential witness. 327 Like the subpoenas that
journalists receive in relation to confidential sources, 3 28 subpoenas issued
in the online-poster context are typically sweeping, requesting "all identi-
fying information regarding the poster" and "seek[ing] the IP address of
the computer from which the person posted the comments to the Web
site,"32 9 along with "the information obtained from the poster when he or
she registered with the Web site, which often includes the person's name
and email address.
330
In the last decade, state courts and federal district courts have ad-
dressed a series of cases involving these subpoenas and have consistently
applied the anonymous-speech doctrine. 33 1 Very recently, federal appellate
courts joined the dialogue and followed the clear pattern set by state courts
and federal district courts in expressly applying the longstanding anony-
mous-speech jurisprudence to cases involving efforts to unmask online
posters. 3 2 Although there is ongoing debate among scholars33  and
324. Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 315, at 16; see also id. ("Alternatively, the suit may
be filed only against, or also against, the Web site or ISP, and the plaintiff serves a discovery
request on those parties. In a copyright dispute, a plaintiff may obtain issuance of a pre-
litigation subpoena under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In criminal matters,
the poster's identity may be sought through a subpoena issued by the grand jury, prosecutor, or
defendant." (citing illustrative cases)).
325. Indeed, so close is the parallel that reporter's privilege statutes have sometimes
successfully been invoked by these communicative entities. See id. at 22.
326. Id. at 16.
327. Id.; see also id. at 25 n. 12 (citing cases).
328. Jones, Media Subpoenas, supra note 8, at 382 (reporting that newsroom leaders
described recent subpoenas as "fishing expedition[s]" and "sweeping in scope").
329. Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 315, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (not-
ing that "[b]ecause many people register using fake names and non-descript e-mail addresses,
the IP address is often the most valuable piece of information sought").
330. Id.
331. E.g., McVicker v. King, 266 ER.D. 92, 94 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Enterline v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775
A.2d 756, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
332. See, e.g., In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653, 656-57 (9th Cir. 2010).
333. See, e.g., Anthony Ciolli, Technology Policy, Internet Privacy, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, II YALE J.L. & TECH. 176, 185-88 (2008), http://yjolt.org/
sites/default/files/- 1 -YJOLT-176.pdf; Lidsky, supra note 321, at 1380; Craig Buske, Note,
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courts3 4 as to the precise application of the doctrine in weighing anonymity
rights against the conflicting interests presented in these cases, it has never
been suggested that the First Amendment right to speak anonymously is not
at stake or that this rubric is not the correct one for analyzing the propriety
of these subpoenas. This admittedly adolescent but burgeoning area of
anonymous-speech case law from the courts sheds important light on the
viability of the proposals in this Article in two ways. First, it demonstrates
the appropriateness of third-party standing in this context. Second, it high-
lights the substantive workability of the anonymous-speech approach.
1. Individual and Third-Party Standing in Cases of
Anonymous Online Posters
The online-poster cases provide a useful framework for thinking about
who should have standing to challenge subpoenas issued to communicative
entities possessing information about the identities of would-be anonymous
speakers. Applying the anonymous-speech doctrine in cases in which the
communicative entity receives the subpoena seeking to reveal the anony-
mous speaker's identity, the online-poster cases have correctly noted that the
interconnectedness of First Amendment liberties and the complexity of pre-
serving the value of anonymity call for two potential avenues for asserting
the constitutional right.
335
On the one hand, the anonymous speaker may herself assert the
anonymity right as an individual speaker. Federal courts in recent cases have
consistently rejected arguments that an anonymous speaker lacks standing to
present a challenge when a subpoena seeking her identity is issued to her
ISP.336 This is plainly the right result, because under the anonymous-speech
doctrine, the individual-liberty interest and the "personal right in the
information sought by the subpoena" '337 belong to the anonymous speaker,
who should always be able to invoke her own constitutional right to speak
anonymously.
However, the case law in this online-poster area also reveals that the
"trend among courts ... is to hold that entities such as newspapers, inter-
net service providers, and website hosts may, under the principle ofjus
Who Is John Doe and Why Do We Care?: Why a Uniform Approach to Dealing with John Doe
Defamation Cases Is Needed, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 429,451-52 (2010); Matthew Maz-
zotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous
Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 859-64 (2010).
334. Compare Dendrite Int'l, 775 A.2d at 760 (applying a prima facie standard), with
Best W. Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *4 (D. Ariz.
July 25, 2006) (applying a summary judgment standard), and Doe No. I v. Cahill, 884 A.2d
451, 460 (Del. 2005) (same).
335. See, e.g., McVicker, 266 F.R.D. at 95; Enterline, 751 F Supp. 2d at 787.
336. See, e.g., In re Rule 45 Subpoena Issued to Cablevision Sys. Corp. Regarding IP
Address 69.120.35.31, No. MISC 08-347 (ARR)(MDG), 2010 WL 2219343, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 5, 2010); Elektra Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-115-FL, 2008 WL 5111885, at
*7 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008).
337. Elektra Entm't Grp., 2008 WL 5111885, at *7.
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tertii standing, assert the rights of their readers and subscribers" who com-
ment anonymously in their communicative spaces.338 A few cases illustrate
particularly well the principles that would likely correspond to the analysis
in the reporter-source context.
In Enterline v. Pocono Medical Center, decided by a federal district
court in 2008, a local newspaper published an article about Enterline's sexu-
al harassment lawsuit against her employer.339 The article appeared in the
newspaper's online edition, where several people posted anonymous com-
ments after the article, opining about the allegations, "with some of the
posters claiming to have personal knowledge of the parties or facts at issue"
in her suit.34° When Enterline served the newspaper a subpoena demanding
the identity of the individuals who had made the anonymous posts, the
newspaper declined, asserting the First Amendment anonymous-speech
rights of the unnamed posters.34 1 The court agreed that the newspaper had
"third-party standing to assert the First Amendment rights of individuals
posting to the [n]ewspaper's online forums. 342 It found that anonymous
commentators "face practical obstacles to asserting their own First Amend-
ment rights,' 3 43 and that "in light of the [n]ewspaper's desire to maintain the
trust of its readers and online commentators,'3" 44 the newspaper could be
relied on to "zealously argue and frame the issues before the Court."345 The
court also found that the newspaper itself "display[ed] the adequate injury-
in-fact to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirements" 346 because
the revelation of the posters' identities would "compromise the vitality of
the newspaper's online forums" and reduce the size of its readership in
harmful ways. 347 In other words, "the relationship between [the newspaper]
and readers posting in the [n]ewspaper's online forums" was the type of re-
lationship that overcame the ordinary prudential bar on third-party standing
and allowed the newspaper to "assert the First Amendment rights of the
anonymous commentators" speaking on its site.
3 48
Another district court reached an identical result a few years later in
McVicker v. King.3 49 There, McVicker issued a subpoena against a local me-
dia company in connection with his unlawful termination suit after a number
of anonymous posts on the company's local news website discussed the ac-
338. McVicker, 266 F.R.D. at 95.
339. 751 F Supp. 2d 782, 783 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
340. Enterline, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 783.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 786.
343. Id.; see also id. at 785-86 (noting the risks of retaliation and damage to relation-
ships that motivated the anonymity).
344. Id. at 786.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. 266 F.R.D. 92 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
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tivities of his employer in ways that McVicker believed would be relevant to
impeaching the employer's testimony.35° The court said that McVicker's
argument that the news site lacked standing to assert the anonymous-speech
rights of the posters could be "rejected rather summarily. ' 35 1 Noting the
same factors highlighted in Enterline-the practical obstacles faced by the
holders of the right, the injuries experienced by the media company itself,
and the likelihood of zealous advocacy by the media company35 -the court
found that the news website "clearly ha[d] third-party standing to assert the
First Amendment rights of individuals anonymously posting to its [local
news] website.
' '3 53
It is notable that in these and other cases, the courts have pointed to the
closeness of the relationship between the speaker and the communicative
entity seeking standing to assert the speaker's rights-both in determining
that the third party has its own injury-in-fact and in assessing the likelihood
of zealous advocacy.3 54 Tellingly, courts have reached the conclusion that the
relationship warrants third-party standing even though the actual relation-
ship between an online poster and either the website on which she posts or
the ISP through which she communicates is not particularly close, in terms
of any mutual interest in message content or flow of information to the pub-
lic. Often, the stated interest of the communicative entity is quite removed
from any joint communicative or public-information goal that it might share
with the speaker or even with the public. The courts focus primarily on the
potential that the online newspaper or ISP will lose advertising revenue or
customers,355 rather than on any interest in expressive activity-and under-
standably so. After all, the speakers in the online-poster cases are chiming in
with their own views after the newsgathering has occurred. They are not
collaboratively providing information to the newsgatherer's effort but are
instead speaking independently, after the fact, with information that the re-
porter and her newspaper have neither deemed newsworthy nor vetted in any
way. Indeed, recent communications scholarship suggests that journalists'
350. McVicker, 266 F.R.D. at 93.
351. Id. at 95.
352. Id. at 96.
353. Id.
354. See id.; Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782, 786 (M.D. Pa. 2008);
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 32 (2000), rev'd sub nom.
Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
355. See, e.g., Enterline, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 786 (noting that preventing the newspaper
from asserting the anonymity rights of the speaker "will ... spark[] reduced reader interest
and a corresponding decline in advertising revenues"); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am.
Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. at 32 (holding that an ISP had standing to assert the First Amend-
ment rights of subscribers who made anonymous posts because if it "did not uphold the
confidentiality of its subscribers, as it has contracted to do, absent extraordinary circum-
stances, one could reasonably predict that [its] subscribers would look to AOL's competitors
for anonymity").
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views of these posters are largely unfavorable.35 6 Although online posts are
plainly capable of making some contribution to public dialogue357 and even
potentially enhancing future newsgathering,358 the communications research
indicates that reporters believe that the practice on the whole fosters bigoted
and hateful comments," 9 diminishes the reputation of the news organiza-
tion, and is not in keeping with longstanding publication policies. 361 Some
say they would gladly do away with the practice entirely.36' News outlets
appear to be protecting these posters out of principle-recognizing that
there would be some chilling effect on future speech if anonymous online
commenters were identified 36Z-and not because they see themselves as tru-
ly engaged in a joint, public-serving First Amendment activity or because
356. See, e.g., Carolyn Nielsen, Newspaper Journalists Support Online Comments,
NEWSPAPER RES. J., Winter 2012, at 86, 94-98 (citing studies indicating that reporters think
poorly of online commenters); Arthur D. Santana, Online Readers' Comments Represent New
Opinion Pipeline, NEWSPAPER RES. J., Summer 2011, at 66, 76 (reporting that journalists "at
the country's largest U.S. daily newspapers generally take a dim view of the online reader
comments" and that "[m]any are troubled by their content"); Lola Burnham & William H.
Freivogel, The Anonymous Poster: Today's Hybrid of the Anonymous Pamphleteer and Anon-
ymous Source?, ALL ACADEMIC, INC. 5 (Aug. 4, 2010), http://convention2.allacademic.com/
one/www/www/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unpublished-manuscript&file
_index=2&pop-up=tme&no click.key=true&attachment style=attachment&PHPSESSID=
mht3chpm48jOjOp42s5obb79q3 (quoting a New York Times lawyer as saying that anonymous
posts are often "nutty" and "defamatory" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
357. Kirtley, supra note 319, at 1507 ("Anonymous ... postings encourage[] robust
debate and help[] promote the First Amendment interest of 'protect[ing] unpopular individuals
from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression.'" (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995))); Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Shielding Jane
and John: Can the Media Protect Anonymous Online Speech?, COMM. LAW., July 2009, at 4, 4
("Anonymous commentary-both online and off-is credited with identifying solutions for
political, social, and cultural challenges; promoting unconventional ideas; and catalyzing
community development and transformation.").
358. See Santana, supra note 356, at 76 ("A vast majority [of journalists responding to
the survey] said they at least occasionally got story ideas from the comments .... ").
359. See Nielsen, supra note 356, at 98 (describing reporters' "extreme problem" with
the "level of bigotry in anonymous online comments").
360. Kirtley, supra note 319, at 1507-08 (quoting a journalist as saying that "anonymity
on the Web offends most journalists I know," both because "their own names go on everything
they write" and because it is inconsistent with decades-long practices of identifying and con-
firming authorship of letters to the editor (quoting Connie Schultz, Web Sites' Anonymity
Brings Out the Worst in Some Posters, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 27, 2009,
http://www.cleveland.com/schultz/index.ssf/2009/09/web-sites-anonymity-brings-out.html)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
361. See, e.g., Rem Rieder, No Comment: It's Time for News Sites to Stop Allowing
Anonymous Online Comments, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Summer 2010, at 2 (arguing that
newspapers should "end the practice of allowing unnamed comments" because it is "flat-out
wrong" and "causing headaches for news outlets"); Santana, supra note 356, at 77-78 (noting
the beginning of a trend among newspapers to disallow anonymity).
362. E.g., Amy Kristin Sanders & Patrick C. File, Giving Users a Plain Deal: Contract-
Related Media Liability for Unmasking Anonymous Commenters, 16 COMM. L. & POL'Y 197,
199-200 (2011) ("Unmasking anonymous commenters threatens to chill the speech of other
users, who fear they might be next.").
1276 [Vol. I111: 1221
Rethinking Reporter's Privilege
they envision the posters as part and parcel of their newsgathering or edito-
rial processes.
In contrast, the relationship between the confidential source and the
newspaper in the course of genuine newsgathering is significantly greater
and authentically combines First Amendment interests in a symbiotic way
that contributes to the larger social good.363 While the newspaper often
knows only the IP address of the anonymous poster, the reporter almost al-
ways knows the identity of the source and has worked with her in developing
the story. Journalistic standards require that the "credibility and motives of the
anonymous source" be investigated before she is quoted in a published story,
while no such process ordinarily occurs for online posters.3 64 And while an
anonymous source "often is a whistleblower in an especially good position to
have newsworthy information," providing "the most important news of the
day," the poster "may be sitting in his or her pajamas spouting unsupported
opinions.'3 65 Thus, although it is unclear whether they will continue to seek
third-party standing,3 66 the online news sites' successful assertion of that
standing on behalf of speakers who are much less obviously entwined with
the communicative mandate of the news organization demonstrates the pro-
priety of third-party standing in the more persuasive context of reporters and
their actual sources.
2. Substantive Application of Anonymous-Speech
Doctrine in Online-Poster Cases
The anonymous-online-poster case law also highlights how the substan-
tive application of the anonymous-speech doctrine in the context of
confidential sources could operate in real-world terms and alleviates any
concern that an application of strict scrutiny would lead to the overprotec-
tion of anonymity interests and the undervaluation of other important
competing concerns. A brief examination of the doctrine's use in these cases
shows the courts taking care to prioritize speech rights but remaining cogni-
zant of the competing need for revealing the identity in certain contexts. In
this way, the analytically and doctrinally superior anonymous-speech ru-
bric seems to better achieve the delicate balance attempted by the qualified
363. See supra notes 266-268 and accompanying text.
364. Burnham & Freivogel, supra note 356, at 2; see also Jones, Empirical Study, supra
note 8, at 651.
365. Burnham & Freivogel, supra note 356, at 2.
366. Some have speculated that it is tactically unwise for website operators and ISPs to
vigorously assert the individual speaker's First Amendment rights because it may threaten
their ongoing immunity under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, as legislators
see aggrieved parties left with no redress from either the publisher or the initial speaker. Kis-
singer & Larsen, supra note 315, at 17; see also Jennifer O'Brien, Note, Putting a Face to a
(Screen) Name: The First Amendment Implications of Compelling ISPs to Reveal the Identities
of Anonymous Internet Speakers in Online Defamation Cases, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2745,
2757 (2002).
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privilege crafted by the Branzburg dissent and adopted by a majority of the
circuits.
As a starting proposition, the online-poster cases have correctly recog-
nized that even when a subpoena is issued against a communicative entity that
possesses the identity but obtained the information on an understanding that it
would publish the speech anonymously, a protectable anonymous-speech
right remains at stake.367 The courts have acknowledged in these cases that
anonymity of communication is a core First Amendment right that serves
critically important values-both of the individual-liberty variety3 68 and of
the public, free-flow-of-information variety.3 69 In so doing, the cases cite the
key precedents giving strong protection to the right of a speaker not to iden-
tify herself and applying strict scrutiny to government impositions on that
right.370 But these cases have also recognized that the right to anonymous
367. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 94-95 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (noting, in the
context of an effort to identify a nonparty witness, that "[t]he United States Supreme Court
has consistently held that 'an author's decision to remain anonymous ... is an aspect of the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment'" (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995))); Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 751 F Supp. 2d 782,
787-88 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting McIntyre in the same context); Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc.,
140 E Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (stating that the effort to unmask an anony-
mous online speaker implicated "[tihe right to the freedom of speech ... enshrined in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution," and that "[t]he anonymity of Internet speech is
protected by the First Amendment"); Doe No. I v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) ("It
is clear that speech over the internet is entitled to First Amendment protection. This protection
extends to anonymous internet speech." (footnotes omitted)).
368. See, e.g., 2TheMart.com, 140 E Supp. 2d at 1092 ("The 'ability to speak one's
mind' on the Internet 'without the burden of the other party knowing all the facts about one's
identity can foster open communication .... ' (quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com,
185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999))); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (noting the potential that a
plaintiff may be motivated by a desire to "subject [the anonymous speaker] to ostracism for
expressing unpopular ideas, invite retaliation from those who oppose her ideas or from those
whom she criticizes, or simply give unwanted exposure to her mental processes" (quoting
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49
DUKE L.J. 855, 890 (2000))).
369. See, e.g., Enterline, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 787 ("[T]he interest in having anonymous
works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requir-
ing disclosure as a condition of entry." (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514
U.S. 334, 342 (1995))); 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 ("The free exchange of ideas
on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet users to communicate anony-
mously'"); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 455-56 (describing the potential of anonymous internet speech
to "allow[] more and diverse people to engage in public debate"); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe,
No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (quoting the "marketplace of ideas"
language from McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995))).
370. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60 (1960); see also McVicker, 266 F.R.D. at 94 (citing Buckley v. Am. Constitutional
Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342; and Talley, 362 U.S.
at 65) ("The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that 'an author's decision to
remain anonymous ... is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment.'" (quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342)); 2TheMart.com, 140 F Supp. 2d at 1092 (citing
Buckley, 525 U.S. at 200; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; and Talley, 362 U.S. at 65) ("A compo-
nent of the First Amendment is the right to speak with anonymity."); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 456
("Anonymous internet speech in blogs or chat rooms in some instances can become the mod-
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speech, like all First Amendment rights,37' is "not absolute,' 37 2 and that
although the burden is high, the government sometimes satisfies it and
may legitimately unmask a speaker who preferred anonymity.
Rightly, the cases have indicated that this may occur when the govern-
ment has an interest in the identity because the anonymous speaker is
legitimately a defendant in a civil suit for defamation or another cause of
action, 373 or because the anonymous speaker is an indispensable witness in a
suit to which she is not a party.374 But courts require demonstrations that
those interests in fact exist, that they are weighty enough to overcome the
core First Amendment anonymity right, and that the demand for the identity
is an appropriately tailored means of meeting the asserted interest. In the
context of an anonymous speaker who is potentially a defendant in a civil
suit, the tool for achieving this has been a careful assessment of that suit's
viability,375 with tests "designed to sort legitimate defamation actions from
em equivalent of political pamphleteering .... '[A]nonymous pamphleteering is not a perni-
cious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and dissent.'" (quoting
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357)); Dendrite Int'l, 775 A.2d at 760 (citing Buckley, 525 U.S. at 182,
197-99; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; and Talley, 362 U.S. 60) ("It is well-established that rights
afforded by the First Amendment remain protected even when engaged in anonymously.").
371. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) ("The protections afforded by the First
Amendment, however, are not absolute ...."); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)
("'[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message ... .' However, this principle, like other First Amendment
principles, is not absolute." (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
372. McVicker, 266 ER.D. at 94 ("[A]nonymous speech on the Internet, like speech from
identifiable sources, does not have absolute protection."); Dendrite Int'l, 775 A.2d at 760
(noting the need to "strik[e] a balance between the well-established First Amendment right to
speak anonymously, and the right of the plaintiff to protect its proprietary interests and reputa-
tion"); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 456 ("[1]t is well understood that the right of free speech is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances." (alteration in original) (quoting Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
373. See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457.
374. See, e.g., McVicker, 266 F.R.D. at 95; Enterline, 751 E Supp. 2d at 787;
2TheMart.com, 140 F Supp. 2d at 1095; Mobilisa Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2007).
375. Under the proposed broader adoption of this approach, this starting point is likely to
prove important in cases in which the government asserts that the underlying anonymous
speech may be illegal or lack fuller First Amendment protection for other reasons. See, e.g.,
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) ("A government entity has broader discretion
to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer."); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,
509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (finding a CIA employment agreement subjecting proposed pub-
lications to prior review a "reasonable means for protecting" the "compelling interest" in
limiting disclosure of classified information). Scholars continue to debate whether leaks by
government employees should receive some protection based on potential value to the public
interest. See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press
and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 240-62 (2008) (tracing history of
government communication with public through leaks and criticizing the executive branch's
"virtually unbridled power to control the flow of national security information to the pub-
lic" under whistleblower statutes and other mechanisms). A full exploration of leaks that
appear to violate statutory mandates against national-security disclosures or to be within
1279May 2013]
Michigan Law Review
'cyberslapps'-unfounded suits designed only to chill speech. '37 6 In cases
where "expressive speech is at issue, as in defamation cases, courts tend to
apply a high-burden test, and when the speech is alleged to constitute copy-
right or trademark infringement, courts tend to apply a low-burden test."
377
In the context of an anonymous speaker who is sought as a nonparty wit-
ness, the courts have demanded that the party seeking disclosure clear an
even "higher hurdle" '378 and have used a four-part test for determining
whether the request for the identity is tailored to protect the speech right that
is at stake:
(1) [whether] the subpoena seeking the information was issued in good
faith and not for any improper purpose, (2) [whether] the information
sought relates to a core claim or defense, (3) [whether] the identifying in-
formation is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense, and
(4) [whether] information sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or
defense is unavailable from any other source.379
What results is a very close cousin to the qualified privilege set forth in the
Branzburg dissent,380 although much more carefully rooted in the appro-
priate anonymous-speech doctrine and much better able to recognize the
full range of First Amendment values at stake in a request to unmask an
other constitutionally recognized limitations on the speech of government employees is
beyond the scope of this Article but worthy of exploration. It should suffice to note that it
would be inconsistent with the approach taken by courts in anonymous-online-poster cases
and with the overarching doctrinal insistence upon the value of anonymity for a court to
unmask an anonymous source on the bare assertion that the speaker's underlying speech
may be punishable.
376. Lidsky, supra note 321, at 1377; see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (describing plain-
tiffs' efforts to unmask anonymous speakers "even if the defamation claim is not very strong,
or worse, if they do not intend to pursue the defamation action to a final decision").
377. Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 315, at 18-19 (surveying the cases and reporting
that "[tihe prevailing view" in expressive-content cases "is that the plaintiff should be required
to put forth sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case or, put differently, to withstand a
hypothetical summary judgment motion," and noting that, by "essentially requiring sufficient
evidence to create a jury issue on the underlying claim ... both tests are very speech protec-
tive"); see also id. at 19 (surveying the cases and noting that in cases where "the speech at
issue is challenged on grounds that it infringes intellectual property rights or otherwise consti-
tutes a business tort, many courts have applied--or at least nominally applied-either a
motion-to-dismiss standard or a good cause standard").
378. McVicker, 266 F.R.D. at 95; see also 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095
("[N]on-party disclosure is only appropriate in the exceptional case where the compelling
need for the discovery sought outweighs the First Amendment rights of the anonymous speak-
er:').
379. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095, quoted in Enterline, 751 F. Supp. 2d at
787.
380. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that
a journalist should be privileged from revealing the identity of a confidential source unless the
govemment "(1) show[s] that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has infor-
mation that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of the law; (2) demonstrate[s]
that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate[s] a compelling and overriding interest in the infor-
mation" (footnote omitted)).
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anonymous speaker. Importantly, both tests essentially require that the
anonymous-speech right be overcome as a last, rather than a first, resort.
381
All told, although the case law in the area of anonymous online posters
is not completely uniform,38 2 and appellate courts likely will need to weigh
in with clarifications on the nuances of the applicable tests, these cases illus-
trate the workability of the approach proposed in this Article. The balance
between protecting anonymous-speech rights and recognizing the counter-
vailing interests that often motivate subpoenas in civil suits and criminal
prosecutions is a delicate one. Anonymous speech has, particularly in recent
years, been portrayed as a dangerous practice and an alarming trend.3 83 But
the core First Amendment principles that have long called for safeguarding
this speech remain critical to both the full realization of individual liberties
and the free flow of public-serving information in our democracy. What is
needed in the confidential-source context is a meaningful framework for rec-
ognizing those First Amendment values and a useful mechanism for
determining when the countervailing interests are compelling enough and the
tailoring is narrow enough to overcome the ordinary rule favoring anonymous
speech. As in the anonymous-online-poster cases, courts may sometimes de-
termine that requiring a reporter to reveal the name of her confidential source
is necessary because the source is legitimately a defendant in a viable civil
suit or is an indispensable witness in a suit to which she is not a party. Assum-
ing a showing that the subpoena was issued in good faith, is directly and
materially relevant to a core claim or defense, and seeks information that is
unavailable from any other source, courts may strike a balance against the
protection of an anonymous speaker, thereby ensuring that the important
competing interests receive their appropriate weight. But the new starting
point for this reporter-source inquiry-the anonymous-speech rights of the
original speaker-will more carefully align the inquiry with the constitu-
tional values at stake and ensure that the necessary balancing is performed
in accordance with longstanding and constitutionally prescribed precepts.
381. See, e.g., Enterline, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 789 ("Plaintiff is able to obtain the infor-
mation needed to pursue her claims through means that do not encroach on the First
Amendment rights of the anonymous commentators... ").
382. Kirtley, supra note 319, at 1482 ("[A] variety of tests have emerged from the lower
courts."); see also Kissinger & Larsen, supra note 357, at 4 ("[T]he law in this area remains in
relative infancy, and media companies fighting these battles are still addressing numerous
open questions.").
383. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Disclosure's Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IowA
L. REV. 753, 758-69 (2012) (describing WikiLeaks' pattern of "distributing purloined data
anonymously" and the criticisms of its practices); Richard Prez-Pefia, News Sites Rethink
Anonymous Online Comments, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/04/12/technology/12comments.html (describing systems developed by some major pub-
lications that give more prominence to named speakers, require registration before posting
comments, review comments before they go online, or do not allow comments at all).
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CONCLUSION
For the last forty years, the critically important speech dynamic between
confidential sources and reporters has been governed by an inappropriately
narrow standard born of a Supreme Court dissent and focused on questions
of definition and degree that were overly complex from the beginning and
have become increasingly intractable over time. The primary public-serving
aim of the post-Branzburg reporter's privilege is a constitutionally admira-
ble one: to ensure the free flow of information to the public by removing
disincentives for confidential sources to come forward with newsworthy
material and for reporters to convey that material to the wider citizenry. But
those goals can be equally, if not better, served by an already-existing body
of First Amendment doctrine that also recognizes imperative individual-
liberty values that are largely overlooked by the post-Branzburg approach.
The Court should recognize the deeply rooted anonymous-speech doc-
trine's applicability in this area and should frame the reporter-confidential
source inquiry within this rubric. Doing so will secure many benefits: It will
serve the wider array of First Amendment values implicated by the situation.
It will offer guidance that is more useful to reporters and sources, eliminate
many of the greatest difficulties in the invocation and application of the post-
Branzburg doctrine, and trigger application of well-established constitutional
doctrines with which litigants have familiarity and courts have expertise. Indi-
vidual speakers may assert these rights themselves, but the Court should also
recognize third-party standing in reporters who promised confidentiality, who
can then assert the fight in response to a subpoena seeking the source's name.
As evidenced by the recent application of the anonymous-speech doctrine in
the analogous setting of online posters, this approach should prove to be both
practically more workable and analytically clearer than the post-Branzburg
approach. Given the very real interests at stake-for anonymous sources, for
reporters who work with them, and for the public that consumes the news
that they produce-this positive doctrinal shift is one that the Court should
be eager to effectuate.
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